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I. INTRODUCTION
Transaction costs are the nuts and bolts of any business, including
the natural gas distribution industry. But despite alleged defects, rate-of-
return regulation remains the predominant means of exerting regulatory
control over costs and and preventing the abuse of monopoly power in
North America. Ironically, however, traditional rate-of-return (ROR)
regulation discourages incentives to become more efficient. Alterna-
tively, incentive rate regulation' could potentially benefit pipelines as
* Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Spring 1993, and Member of the Faculty of
Law, University of Glasgow, Scotland. B.A., 1982, Lakehead University; LL.B., 1985, University of
Dundee; LL.M., 1988, University of British Columbia. Mr. Black is admitted to the Alberta Bar.
1. In the electricity industry, these rates, when properly structured, "foster larger purchases of
1
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they restructure in the 1990s to adust to direct sales, capacity brokering,
and transition cost concerns. Recently, both the United States Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the National Energy Board
of Canada (NEB or the Board) have announced reviews of this regula-
tory tool.2 This paper identifies some of the major issues. It begins with
a survey of regulatory methodology, including toll methodology for new
facilities, traditional rate-of-return regulation, and the alternative price
cap regulation model. These familiar topics are followed by a discussion
of regulatory lag and the rationales for incentive rate regulation. The
article concludes with some tentative suggestions for regulators.
II. THE NATURE OF REGULATION
A. Gas Distribution as a Public Utility
Heuristically, the natural gas distribution industry in Canada may
be broadly thought of as a public utility. Such entities have been the
subject of considerable study in Canada and a fortiori, in the United
States, given its huge and dynamic economy. Many of the concepts per-
tamining to this subject are essential to an understanding of the related
concepts existing in Canada, including those of definitional and struc-
tural categories. Hence, a preliminary characteristic of a public utility
has been described as the established right of the public to provide a
special regulatory scheme for particular industries.3
electricity, particularly from large industrial customers, in non-peak hours; thus increasing a utility's
profitability without requiring it to add additional capacity." WILLIAM Fox & GUNTHER KOHNE,
COMPETITION IN NETWORK-BOUND ENERGY SYSMMS, in LEIGH HANCHER & ALASTAIR LUCAS,
MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION IN ENERGY SUPPLY, in INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, EN-
ERGY LAW '90: CHANGING ENERGY MARKETS-THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 237 (1990) [herein-
after ENERGY '90].
2. The FERC proposed policy statement dated March 13, 1992. Patrick Crow, Watching
Washington, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 42. FERC Commissioner Branko Terzik is proposing a
draft document concerning incentive regulation that he says is "the second best alternative to worka-
ble competitive markets." He hopes to avoid a rigid approach by adopting a policy based on specific
standards, which is prospective in nature, providing progress reviews and requiring a finding of
quantifiable benefits for each pipeline's customers. Regulators "must be willing to recognize success
and allow pipelines higher returns if they earn them." Previously, the FERC published a draft
comprehensive incentive plan. See 1 RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP, INCENTIVE REGULATION
IN THE ELECTRIC UTILrrY INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT (1983) (prepared for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission).
The NEB held 1992 Public Consultation on Incentive Regulation, National Energy Board of
Canada file no. 4500-AOOO-9, notice of proceedings dated 23 March 1992 and 22 June 1992, in
Calgary on December 8-10, 1992. Among the issues discussed were (i) existing methodologies and
(ii) alternatives to traditional cost of service regulation. The latter includes, for instance, new meth-
odologies for promoting and rewarding efficiency in pipeline companies' operations.
3. JOHN BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 1 (1925). A lucid Canadian
account of public utility regulation and natural gas contractual obligations in Ontario can be found
[Vol. 28:349
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Public utilities involve necessary public services and often result in a
monopoly of the particular enterprise.' Theoretically, monopolies are
the opposite of markets, which enjoy perfect competition or the optimum
efficiency brought about by competitive behavior and performance. In a
free market system, competition benefits consumers by creating an effi-
cient distribution of resources among individuals, thereby inhibiting the
skewed realization of profits by a business without rivals. Occasionally,
the theory of competition is susceptible to failure. Sometimes it cannot
work in practice due to the effects of industry costs and the size of the
market. These factors permit the existence of only a single firm. This
latter phenomenon is better known as a natural monopoly.'
The distinction between pure competition and a monopolistic enter-
prise has been criticized as an oversimplification. While it is rare to find
absolute "perfect" competition in the free market, public utilities may
conversely experience forms of competition, such as the alternative or
substitute fuels available to natural gas users. Nevertheless, the notion of
natural monopolies is basically sound. Certain types of business, such as
a natural gas pipeline, are frequently affected by technical exigencies that
would induce economic inefficiency if it were not for a monopoly of the
market. Accordingly, nationalization of the industry is one way to cope
with the politically perceived failure of a market economy.' This study
addresses another "substitute for competition,"7 namely that of natural
gas utilities regulation.
Natural monopolies are associated with economies of scale, where
the duplication of services by competitors is uneconomic because of the
business' high fixed costs and where one business can operate more effec-
tively than those in a competitive environment could.' Although Canada
does not have many natural monopolies, the downstream natural gas in-
dustry forms part of this category, at both the local distribution level and
at the long distance pipeline level. For instance, the enormous size of the
country and relatively small population are some of the factors that pre-
vent the entry of a competitor for TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. (TCPL),
the monopolistic interprovincial natural gas pipeline. Therefore, direct
in ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, EBRO No. 410-1,411-1,412-1 (Dec. 12, 1986), reprinted in, CANADA
ENERGY LAW SERVICE 1-1511 (C.D. Hunt & A.R. Lucas, eds. 1991).
4. ELI W. CLEMENS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 25 (1950).
5. ERNEST GELLHORN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 44-
49 (2d ed. 1987).
6. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 10-11 (1961).
7. Id. at 10.
8. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 5, at 9-10.
1993]
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governmental regulation of natural monopolies in general, 9 and of the
natural gas transmission industry in particular, appears necessary for a
variety of reasons.
Regulation can inhibit the excess profits of a monopolist by provid-
ing a restraint on the rates that it charges, as well as on the type of activi-
ties in which it engages. Without regulation, an inefficient allocation of
resources could result from the higher prices paid by consumers to the
monopolist."° Invariably, public utilities are monopolies or partial mo-
nopolies that are controlled by statutory regulatory bodies which deter-
mine, inter alia, charges for services as well as the type of services to be
made available. Their enabling legislation tends to require "non-discrim-
inatory" contractual provisions with customers, and that the rates
charged be "just and reasonable."'11
One of the most compelling reasons in support of utilities regulation
is the prevention of discrimination in pricing and provision of services.
Broadly speaking, "Social norms of fairness may be violated when indi-
viduals are subject to different (discriminatory) treatment. Price discrimi-
nation, in effect, is a form of income redistribution resulting from the
ability of the seller to separate consumers into different classes based on
different intensities of preference (elasticity of demand)."' 2
The extent of discrimination in the provision of services by Cana-
dian natural gas utilities is believed to be a controversial question. It is
also a problematic one which deserves a larger treatment than this over-
view of utilities regulation can provide. Hence its ramifications are elab-
orated below, both in a philosophical sense and later, with application to
changes in the industry.
Another rationale for regulation is its use "as a proxy for fiscal pol-
icy."' 13 This frequently occurs in the cross-subsidization of services,
where regulators allow certain prices to be offered below their actual
cost, only to be offset by other services provided above cost.14 An anal-
ogy to this latter reason may be seen with the system of uniform postage
stamp rates, which charge the same price regardless of whether a letter is
9. ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, RESPONSIBLE REGULATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 46
(1979) [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE REGULATION].
10. ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REGULATION REFERENCE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT
20 (1978) [hereinafter REGULATION REFERENCE].
11. T.G. KANE, THE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC POLICY, CONSUMERS AND THE
REGULATORS 3 (1980); See Railway Act, § 321 R.S.C. Ch. R-2 (1970).
12. See REGULATION REFERENCE, supra note 10.
13. G.B. DOERN, REGULATORY PROCESSES AND REGULATORY AGENCIES, in PUBLIC POLICY
IN CANADA 158, 164 (G.B. Doern & Paul Aucoin, eds., 1979).
14. Id.
[Vol. 28:349
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intended for a nearby location or for a distant one. Cross-subsidization is
an effective tool that provides a basic level of service to all persons within
a particular jurisdiction, having been described by one commentator to
be "taxation by regulation."15
Thus it is well recognized that a combination of investment tax cred-
its and accelerated depreciation can result in a rate of return that is
higher after tax has been computed than before, particularly when the
taxpayer has income from other sources or when some mechanism exists
for transferring those tax incentives that cannot currently be used by the
taxpayer. 1
6
Furthermore, regulatory agencies are borne from politics, and their
actions have an impact upon politics. They can dispose of matters with
lest cost than the legislature yet should be reasonably stable, and not
mercurially bend to every new political wind. 7 Types of regulatory pro-
grams include: (i) cost-of-service rate making, 8 which is predominant
when monopoly prices are at issue; (ii) historically based price controls,
which are used typically for economy-price regulation (such as hospi-
tals); (iii) allocation, such as natural gas allocation or the issue on some
T.V. licenses, which can be made under a public interest standard. Some
allocation is made historically, such as oil allocation or the rationing of
food in time of war. Sometimes products are individually screened,
which is a notional form of licensing (including drugs and work place
carcinogens). Standard setting involves the requiring or prohibiting of
certain conduct by certain persons.' 9
B. Toll Methodology for New Facilities
Economic reasons for regulation are not necessarily the sole criteria,
and Canada has committed itself to well known regulatory measures for
non-economic reasons such as cultural or social concerns. Historically,
15. Richard A. Posner, Taxation By Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22-50 (1971).
16. Bryan R. Eymes, Financing Resource Facilities: The Case Of Natural Gas,-CAN. TAX J.
1095 (1986); see E. CARY BROWN, BUSINESS INCOME TAXATION AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES,
in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 300 (1948).
17. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change,
and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1108 (1988) (citing THEO-
DORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126
(2d ed. 1979)).
18. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 11-12 (3d ed. 1992). Cost-of-service rate making is the most commonly used method
for regulating prices in a wide variety of industries, including trucking, natural gas production, and
hospitals.
19. Id. at 12.
1993]
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the building of this nation was at least partly achieved through regula-
tory support for the Canadian Pacific Railway to create a transcontinen-
tal railroad, and the implementation of protective trade tariffs to foster
the nascent manufacturing industry. In contemporary Canada these
objectives may be illustrated in the broadcasting industry. The Canadian
Radio and Television Commission has a mandate to promote creative
Canadian content there,20 even though its success in preserving the elu-
sive Canadian identity remains doubtful.
Other industries have been subjected to social policy objectives be-
sides the communication industry. These objectives are not static but can
change over time, as is shown by the case of railway rates in Canada.
From 1886 until the Railway Act of 1903, control over rates was vested
in a federal cabinet sub-committee which was called the Railway Com-
mittee of the Privy Council. The Act created the Board of Railway
Commissioners as the body with the requisite "detached professional-
ism"21 necessary for the daily supervision of the railways.
The Board of Railway Commissioners was consumed in turn by the
Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) pursuant to the 1967 National
Transportation Act, which recognized the diversity and growth in the
various national transportation systems. The CTC was accorded exten-
sive advisory and policy functions to complement its strict regulatory
capacity.22 Attention was shifted to the national transportation system
as a viable economic enterprise from the previous emphasis on it as an
instrument used primarily to promote national policy objectives.2 3
Hence the function of regulation is subject to change with the passage of
time and with social, economic and political vicissitudes.
For instance, concern over trade and commerce, foreign take-overs
of Canadian businesses, and new businesses controlled by non-Canadi-
ans, resulted in the creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency
(FIRA) in 1973 by the former Liberal government led by Pierre Tru-
deau. The relative economic nationalism and stringent criteria of that
federal agency was superseded by a new agency, Investment Canada, cre-
ated in 1985 by the Progressive Conservative government headed by Mr.
Mulroney. Parliamentary attitudes concerning the direct regulation of
20. RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, supra note 9, at 52.
21. Hudson N. Janisch, The Role of the Independent Regulatory Agency in Canada, 27 U. NEW
BRUNSWICK L.J. 83, 89-94 (1978).
22. Id.
23. RESPONSIBLE REGULATION, supra note 9, at 52.
[Vol. 28:349
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foreign investments had been affected, inter alia, by an economic reces-
sion, as well as by criticism from international financiers and the United
States government. 24 Under the capitalist ideology of the present govern-
ment, "Canada is open for business again,"25 tacitly implying that previ-
ous regulatory measures had inhibited business.
Changes in the political composition of the government thus tend to
involve tinkering with the regulatory framework. Politically, it is a legiti-
mate way in which to directly coerce desired behavior from individuals.
After all, regulation is "one instrument of governing from a range of
other instruments. ' 26 It is a powerful instrument whose process can in-
clude the rendering of policy advice, the resolution of disputes, the con-
duct of specialized research, and the administration of subsidies.
Advantages may be obtained from the delegation of responsibilities to a
so-called quasi-independent regulatory board instead of having the same
functions performed by regular government departments. The govern-
ment can control the regulatory body's mandate without being as closely
bound by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility for the regulatory
decisions.27
The doctrine is one of accountability to Parliament based upon non-
legal political conventions. Canadian regulatory history displays "a con-
stant process of working out the tensions inherent to our commitment to
parliamentary responsibility and the need for regulatory tribunals which
fall to some degree outside the sphere of immediate political control."28
In the United States, regulatory agencies seem to be more independ-
ent than their Canadian counterparts. Although the Congress oversees
their function and may frame legislation to reverse their decisions, the
agencies are otherwise distanced from congressional control. Moreover,
the agencies are outside the ambit of the President's control or direction
since they are not part of the executive branch of government.29 More
public accountability accrues to the Canadian cabinet for their behavior
than to the American cabinet because of the different government
hierarchies.
Despite the benefits of utilities regulation, certain problems have
been identified by critics of the process. The benefits may be outweighed
24. E. James Arnett, From FIRA to Investment Canada, 24 ALBERTA. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1985).
25. See Notes for a speech by the Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to the members of the Eco-
nomic Club of New York (Dec. 10, 1984).
26. Doern, supra note 13, at 160.
27. Id. at 172-74.
28. Janisch, supra note 21, at 87.
29. Id. at 87-91.
1993]
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by the costs related to the administration of regulatory programs. Cost
analysis and effective regulation are said to be impracticable due to the
enormous size of some utilities. Adaptation to market or technological
changes has caused problems in addition to the concern that private in-
terests may unduly influence their nominal regulators. 30 Furthermore,
some public finance commentators allege that government intervention
in general, and regulatory agencies in particular, will not fare better in
the event of the competitive market failing.31A pernicious aspect of regu-
lation has been identified as its inclination to stifle the competition that
could otherwise challenge the regulated monopolies. An American com-
mentator suggests that the detriments of a natural monopoly are exagger-
ated and that regulation has an adverse social and economic impact. 32 It
is nevertheless submitted that the regulatory process is worthwhile de-
spite its deficiencies, especially in Canada, which has a more limited
economy than its neighboring economic leviathan. Perhaps one of the
leading problems with public utility regulation lies in its attempt to levy
equitable prices to customers for services rendered.
III. RATE DETERMINATION AND DISCRIMINATION
Natural gas utilities regulation is thought to be a substitute for the
invisible hand and competitive prices of the free market. The regulatory
process normally achieves this goal by determining the cost of the service
to be provided by the regulated firm. These costs are estimated for a
particular period, and they may comprise the expenses inherent in run-
ning the business, such as depreciation, plant, financing, labor, and other
operating costs. A maximum rate scale is then set which simultaneously
allows enough revenue to be generated from the utility's customers plus a
reasonable profit.33
Public utility rates have several important functions. Their role in-
cludes the setting of charges that allow a fair rate of return from the
venture so that the company can attract further capital for expansion.
These charges try to promote an efficient price through lower production
30. G. B. Reschenthaler, Regulatory Failure and Competition, 19 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 466, 470-
71 (1976).
31. B. Lesser, Comments on "Regulatory Failure and Competition" by G.B. Reschenathaler, 20
CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 389 (1977).
32. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 635-36
(1969).
33. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY 223-24 (2d ed. 1985).
[Vol. 28:349
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costs, in substitution for the way in which competition encourages effi-
cient pricing. Consumer demand may be purposefully influenced by the
design of rates. A well structured design adjusts the prices and imitates
the adjustment in a competitive market where demand is generally ex-
pected to increase with lower rates or conversely to lessen with higher
rates.34
Inherent to these functions is the desire to provide a community
with adequate utility service economically. An additional and distinct
function of utilities rates has the goal of transferring purchasing power or
redistributing income from the consumers to the utility company, and
eventually to its shareholders and creditors.3 5 However, the standard
used to determine this function is not entirely based on fiscal criteria
since customers do not pay solely for what they consume. Various socio-
economic and political factors tend to influence the process and induce
one class of utility users to subsidize the costs of another class. For ex-
ample, income redistribution may occur when residential rates are more
inelastic than those of industrial users. Although the cost of service for
industrial users as a class may be less than for residential users, it has
been argued that the former class should pay higher rates.3 6
Accordingly, it is the duty of regulatory tribunals to determine
whether this type of bias constitutes undue or unjust discrimination. One
way of answering this question is to consider the social and economic
effects of various rate designs that set discriminatory prices. It is possible
to give a price advantage to a certain customer class and inhibit custom-
ers in that class from switching to another energy source while at the
same time contributing to the overall maintenance of the system, thereby
benefitting those who pay higher prices. Discrimination in rate making is
popularly thought to be an odious term. However, some degree of price
discrimination among different customer classes is inevitable due to the
problems inherent in coordinating sales and service. Efficient distribu-
tion of natural gas requires that supply and demand be coordinated over
both the short and long terms.37 This coordination process is broadly
controlled by general principles of public utility regulation. This process
is also affected by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA)3 s and
34. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 49-58.
35. Id. at 59.
36. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 111, 116 (1981).
37. Deborah Cohn & Robert Means, Common Carriage of Natural Gas, 59 TUL. L. REv. 529,
539-40 (1985). Storage, an important part of the co-ordination function, is commonly offered as a
separate service.
38. Alexander J. Black, Economic and Environmental Regulatory Relations: U.S.-Canada Free-
1993]
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deregulation, which have encouraged "open access," or in other words,
third party (direct sales) carriage.
In North America, pipeline companies have traditionally operated
as transporters as well as brokers of the commodity. In this traditional
structure, gas "flows from producer to pipeline to distributor to con-
sumer, with the title passing at each change of possession."' 39 Typically,
pipelines purchase gas from producers, transport it, and resell it to local
distributor companies (LDCs). These bargains require considerable fore-
casting of market conditions. Pipelines attempt to balance supply and
demand fluctuations in three main ways: (1) elimination of random fluc-
tuations in supply and demand; (2) moderation of non-random fluctua-
tions caused by weather and the business cycle; and (3) assurance of a
balance some years into the future.4' Most pipeline companies serve
enough producers and consumers that small fluctuations in supply and
demand balance each other out. A widely used technique is line-packing,
or pipeline storage.41 This method involves adjusting gas pressure, draw-
ing on it when demand temporarily exceeds supply, and adding to it
when supply temporarily exceeds demand, thus using the line as inven-
tory without interrupting service.42 But the gas transportation industry
is invariably a monopoly.43 Natural monopolies are associated with
economies of scale, where the duplication of services by competitors is
uneconomical because of the business' high fixed costs, and where one
business can operate more effectively than those in a competitive environ-
ment could. Hence there is a compelling need to regulate the industry in
order to prevent windfall or excessive profits and undue discrimination in
Trade in Energy, - CONN. J. INT'L L. - (1993) (forthcoming in spring of 1993). For example, the
FTA prohibits minimum export prices.
39. Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1983).
40. Robert S. Angyal & Roberta C. Means, The Regulation and Future Role of Direct Producer
Sales, 5 ENERGY L.J. 1, 39 (1984).
41. Unlike other energy commodities, electricity cannot be stored: Electrical generation and
transmission must be constantly matched with demand.
42. Jon Bernhardt, Note, Is Natural Gas Pipeline Regulation Worth the Fuss?, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 753, 765-66 (1988).
43. Although the term "monopoly" has a spurious connotation, some economists have said
that monopolies produce a net benefit. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1934). Schumpeter stressed the creative benefits of monopoly and justified it to the
extent that it added incentive to innovate. He picturesquely analogized innovative competition to
"gales of creative destruction." See also ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970). Professor Kahn defined a natural monopoly as "an industry
in which the economies of scale-that is, the tendency for average costs to decrease the larger the
producing firm-are continuous up to the point that one company supplies the entire demand." Id.
at 123-24.
[V/ol. 28:349
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rates.44
A common carrier must generally uphold four duties: the duty to
serve, the duty to deliver, the duty to charge reasonable rates, and the
duty to avoid discrimination. In the U.S., there does not appear to be a
specific statutory definition of a common carrier's obligations except as it
applies to particular industries (railroads, trucking and oil pipelines). Yet
the natural gas industry is different from these others, and their analogies
do not constitute an exact fit. Natural gas utilities have invariably faced
a conundrum concerning the obligations of a "common carrier" to serve
in the face of a capacity constraint.45
In Little Rock & F. TS. Railway Co. v. Oppenheimer,46 the plaintiff
shipper claimed undue and unjust discrimination by the railway com-
pany, and alleged that the railway facilities for transporting cotton in his
part of the state were inferior to those in other areas. Arkansas legisla-
tion provided that "[a]l individuals, associations and corporations shall
have equal rights to have persons and property transported over railways
in this state, and no unjust or undue discrimination shall be made in
charges for, and facilities for, transportation of freight or passengers
within the state."'47 The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that providing
different facilities at different stations was not discriminatory because of
the difference in their size and traffic. The court stated that
cars and trains are not the only facilities within the meaning of this
Act. A depot, a house for freight, or a waiting room for passengers is a
facility for the transportation of passengers and freight, within the
meaning of this statute. If a railway company should at one of its
stations permit the use of its depot, yard, pen or stational facility to
one shipper and refuse them to other shippers, under the same condi-
tions and circumstances, I think that there could be no doubt that it
44. For a brief treatment of marginal costs, rate-of-return, and utilities regulation, see Alexan-
der J. Black, Public Utilities and Regulatory Theory, 1 OGTLR 12-16 (1989/1990).
45. PAUL R. CARPENTER ET AL., CENTER FOR ENERGY POLICY RESEARCH, NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE REGULATION AFTER FIELD PRICE DECONTROL (Sept. 1983):
There is no specific statutory definition of the obligations of a "common carrier" outside its
application to particular industries (railroads, trucking and oil pipelines). Traditionally
though, a common carrier must uphold four duties: the duty to serve, the duty to deliver,
the duty to charge reasonable rates, [and] the duty to avoid discrimination .... Other
industries do not provide good analogies for how the concept may be applied to gas pipe-
lines. The central problem involves the duty to serve under a capacity constraint.
By way of example, taverns are not subject to the common law based rule akin to the hotelier's duty
to provide accommodation to travellers unless there is a reasonable cause to refuse. See Christie v.
The York Corp. [1940] S.C.R. 139.
46. 43 S.W. 150 (Ark. 1897).
47. Id. at 150.
1993]
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would become liable for a penalty.48
Legislation now occupies the field in Canada and the U.S., although reg-
ulation of rates was originally conducted by common law courts.
A common carrier's duty to serve all of its customers equally (albeit
imposing reasonable conditions) in the carriage of goods or persons goes
back in English law to at least 1683.19 In Canada the rule goes back as
far as 1867.5 When railroads were incorporated in England, so-called
"equality clauses" were inserted into the private Parliamentary Acts of
incorporation. These provided for uniformity of treatment of customers'
relations with the railroad. In one early English case it was said that "I
know no common law reason why a carrier may not charge less than
what is reasonable to one person, or even carry for him free of all
charge. "52
Thus, the doctrine of unjust discrimination does not pertain primar-
ily to the intrinsic reasonableness of rates. Rather, it addresses questions
of relative equality and the fact that a benefit to one results in injury to
another.5 3  In other words, a regulatory board's legislative mandate
obliges it to determine whether the particular consumer rates applied for
are just and reasonable, not whether the underlying producer-transporter
supply contracts are prudent.
In Canada, licensing and rate-making are quasi-judicial functions. 4
The NEB has the authority to issue licenses in order to export gas from
48. Id. at 155; see also Knoll Golf Club v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.J. 1959);
Montana v. Cave, 52 P. 200 (Mont. 1898).
49. See Jackson v. Rogers, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (1683).
50. See WALTER S. TARNOPOLSKY, DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW IN CANADA (1982); Leo-
nard v. American Express Co., (1867) 26 U CAN. QBR 533, aff'd, Jones v. Gran, 5 O.W.R. 611
(1905); Graham & Strang v. Dominion Express Company, 55 D.L.R. 39 (1920), aff'd, Ludditt v.
Ginger Coote Airways Ltd., [1942] S.C.R. 406, aff'd, [1947] A.C. 233 (P.C.); Garton v. Bristol &
Exeter Ry. Co., 121 Eng. Rep. 656 (1861).
51. Benjamin Kline, The Origin of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination, 66 U. PA. L. REV.
123, 127 (1918).
52. Baxendale v. The E. Counties Ry., 4 C.B. 63 (1858) (Byles, J). Other English authorities
addressing the meaning of undue preference or undue discrimination include Pickering Phipps v.
London & N.W. Ry. [1982] 2 K.B. 229; London Electricity Bd. v. Spring Gate [1969] 3 All E.R. 289
(1947 Electricity Act); South West Water v. Rumble's [1985] 1 All E.R. 513 (considering § 30(5) of
the Water Act of 1973). Section 30(4) provides that charges must reflect the cost of service. Section
provides that "[a] water authority may make different charges for the same service, facility or right
in different cases ... but it shall be [their duty to ensure that] their charges are such as not to show
undue preference to, or to discriminate unduly against, any class of persons."
53. Kline, supra note 51, at 134.
54. Roger C. Carter, The National Energy Board of Canada and the American Administrative
Procedure Act: A Comparative Study, 34 SASK. L. REv. 104, 110-12 (1969). Carter states that the
duty to decide functions will affect rights or impose obligations. Security Export Co. v. Hethering-
ton, [1923] S.C.R. 539, 549-551.
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or import it to Canada.5- The NEB was created by Canadian Parliament
in 1959,56 following the recommendations of two Royal Commissions.5 7
Licensing and ratemaking are other quasi-judicial functions. 8
Licenses must issue under the Board's authority in order to export gas
from or import it to Canada.59 Pursuant to the NEB's rate-making pow-
ers, all tolls are required to be "just and reasonable,"'c and the Board
may disallow rates and prescribe other rates in their stead. Significantly,
the Act prohibits the setting of "any unjust discrimination; in tolls, ser-
vice or facilities, against any person or any locality."'" The normal evi-
dentiary burden is reversed upon proof of such favoritism since the onus
of proving justified discrimination rests with the natural gas company. 62
However, the problem of determining equitable rates6 3 and of ferreting
out unjustified discriminatory practices is not straightforward. In the
55. National Energy Board Act, S.C. 1959, ch. 46, currently available at R.S.C. 1985 ch. N-7
[hereinafter NEB Act]. See H. G. J. Aitken, The Midwestern Cose" Canadian Gas and the Federal
Power Commission, 25 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI., 129, 130 (1959); Roland Priddle, Chairman,
National Energy Board, A Canadian National Energy Board Perspective on North American Gas
Trade Issues, 12th Annual Natural Gas Conference (speech delivered Jan. 24, 1992). Chairman
Priddle stated that:
We [the NEB] are a thoroughly independent, quasi-judicial tribunal. We have similar
roots to American public utility regulatory tribunals, but with a somewhat broader man-
date and, at least until recently, we have experienced fewer court challenges .... Some of
our decisions, such as facilities certification and export licensing are subject to approval
[but not variance] by the Canadian Cabinet. In other areas, such as the setting of just and
reasonable pipeline tolls, our decisions are final .... [Our mandate] is in some respects
broader than that of the FERC... [ as] we provide energy information and advice to the
government and public and we expect shortly to be made responsible for aspects of oil and
gas regulation in the Canadian North. On the other hand, we have never regulated well-
head gas prices .... Our environmental scope is broad: the environmental and land-use
effects of pipeline construction and operation are fully integrated into the decision-making
process leading to the issuance of a certificate authorizing their construction.
Id.
56. NEB Act, supra note 55.
57. B.D. Fisher, The Role of the National Energy Board in Controlling the Export of Natural
Gas from Canada, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 553, 556 (1971). See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CANADA'S
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, FINAL REPORT (1957) (Walter Gordon, Chairman).
58. Carter, supra note 54, at 110-12. Carter states the duty to decide function will affect rights
or impose obligations. Security Export Co., [1923] S.C.R. at 549-551.
59. NEB Act, supra note 55, §§ 81, 82, 17(3).
60. Id. § 62 ( "All tolls shall be just and reasonable, and shall always under substantially simi-
lar circumstances and conditions with respect to all traffic of the same description carried over the
same route be charged equally to all persons at the same rate."). Compare CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§§ 451, 453 (West Supp. 1986); N. Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 65(1)(3) (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1986).
61. NEB Act, supra note 55.
62. Id. §§ 50-57.
63. MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA 1988, NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD: AN
INTRODUCTION (1989). The NEB regulates the tolls and tariffs of the pipelines under its jurisdiction
to ensure they are just and reasonable and that no unjust discrimination takes place in tariffs or
service. The NEB takes into consideration the financial concerns of the pipeline companies, such as
the capital and operating costs, the need for the companies to earn a reasonable rate of return on
investment, and the cost of expanding service. Concurrently, the Board ensures that
13
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United States, some states have elaborated upon the rule against unjust
discrimination by requiring that the facilities to be "used and useful"64
before their related costs can be incorporated in rates. Still others permit
incorporating only costs which have been "prudently incurred."6 Alto-
gether, these functions are facilitated by the NEB's ability to make its
own rules of practice and procedure.66 With the approval of the Gover-
nor in Council, the Board may use its delegated powers to make pipeline
safety rules and compel the production of books of account.67
Few NEB members admit that the Board in any way makes policy
[but] it is clear that the extremely general nature of these guiding gov-
ernment policies leaves considerable scope for policy formulation by
the Board through decisions in particular applications and through in-
terpretation in the establishment of proceedings and standard condi-
tions. There can be no doubt that the Board makes Policy.68
Given the detailed finances of the industry and the availability of creative
accounting techniques, this latter provision is important in cost analysis
verification.
Finally, the statute appears to oust the jurisdiction of the courts to
grant the prerogative remedies of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibi-
tion 69 by providing that all Board decisions are "final and conclusive"
except for a limited appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal on a "question
[the] companies that ship the oil or natural gas are protected from excessively high trans-
portation costs. A pipeline company's tariff contains the conditions under which transpor-
tation service is provided. The tariff includes conditions on accepting new shippers, on
determining which position a shipper will occupy on the waiting list for service (queuing),
and on allocating capacity to shippers when the pipelines are operating at capacity. The
Board requires that pipeline companies operate under the principles of open access and
non-discrimination. To explain further: all parties must have access to transportation
(whether firm or interruptible) on the same non-discriminatory basis. These principles are
applicable to domestic and export interruptible customers, and to pipeline affiliates, local
distribution companies, and independent shippers. In addition, the tolls for services pro-
vided under similar circumstances and conditions must be charged equally to all customers
of a pipeline.
Id.
64. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1005.5(d) (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, 1
9-211 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
65. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 463 (West Supp. 1986) (requiring commission to disallow
expenses resulting from "error or omission" in planning, construction, or operation of utility facili-
ties, and permitting the commission to find other utility expenses "unreasonable or imprudent"); N.
Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 66(12) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (allowing the commission to order a refund of
monies collected pursuant to increased rates arising from fuel adjustment clauses when the utility
was found to have exercised less than "reasonable care" in providing electrical service).
66. NEB Act, supra note 55, § 7.
67. Id. §§ 39(2), 88.
68. T. BELL & A. R. LUCAs, THE NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD: POLICY, PROCEDURE, AND
PRACTICE 35-36 (1977).
69. Carter, supra note 54, at 112.
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of law or a question of jurisdiction."7 Conversely, before gas leaves the
Province of Alberta, either intra-provincially or internationally, it re-
quires an Alberta removal permit in addition to Federal NEB authoriza-
tion.7" Conservation72 includes economic conservation, and hence
removal permits can be used to promote provincial public interest. The
Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) is the provincial
natural resource management tribunal and has a considerable impact
upon the natural gas industry. It can make "just and reasonable orders"
affecting, inter alia, "economic, orderly, and efficient development" of oil
and gas as well as preventing its waste.73 Hence, beside the competing
private interests there exist two tiers of regulation in Canada, federal and
provincial, which sometimes conflict.
Like most laws, natural gas regulation does not exist in a vacuum.
It is affected by complex social, fiscal, economic, and technological fac-
tors that pertain to supply and transportation arrangements. In particu-
lar, pipeline sales are characterized by long-term firm sales74
arrangements, while transportation for others consist mostly of "spot"
sales which are generally short-term interruptible sale7" arrangements. A
firm sales customer is contractually entitled to purchase natural gas on
demand up to a daily maximum (his contract demand).7 6 On the other
70. NEB Act, supra note 55, §§ 18, 19.
71. Each province is exclusively empowered to make laws pertaining to the exploration, devel-
opment, management and conservation of forest resources, and non-renewable resources in the prov-
ince, as well as electrical energy facilities. Constitution Act of 1867, §§ 92A(l)(a)-(e); Gas
Resources Preservation Act, R.S.A. 1980 ch. G-3.1, amended by S.A. 1984, ch. G-3.1, § 2(1), S.A.
1986 ch. 17, § 3, ch. D-18.1, and S.A. 1987, ch. 23) (Alberta removal permits); see also Natural Gas
Marketing Act, S.A. (1986) ch. N-2.8, §§ 12(1), (2), amended by the Natural Gas Marketing
Amendment Act, 1991 (Bill 41, passed in June 1991); Natural Gas Marketing Amendment Act,
1992 ch. 25 (Bill 12), and Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 1980, ch. A-43 (amended by S.A. 1983 ch. 18 &
S.A. 1986 ch. 10, § 17; NB Petroleum Marketing Amendment Act 1992 ch. 28, Bill 11; Energy
Resources Conservation Amendment Act, S.A.1992, ch. 14, Bill 10; Mines & Mineral Amendment
Act, S.A. 1992, ch. 20, Bill 18.
72. For example, Alberta currently uses a 15 year mandated surplus test to provide for the
volume of gas needed to protect Alberta core users. ALBERTA ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVA-
TION BOARD, GAS SUPPLY PROTECTION FOR ALBERTA: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (REPORT 87-
A) 17-20 (1987).
73. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, R.S.A. 1980, ch. 0-5, §§ 4, 7; amended by Oil & Gas Con-
servation Amendment Act, 1982 S.A., ch. 27.
74. Firm service is a relatively high-priced transportation service that provides for transporta-
tion of up to a maximum daily volume without interruption except under extraordinary
circumstances.
75. Interruptible T-service is an interruptible gas transportation service provided under con-
tract for gas not owned by the pipeline company. Interruption occurs at the option of the pipeline
company or distributor. There are two tiers of interruptible service. IS-1 is higher priority, offering
less risk of interruption than IS-2, which is lower priority. The toll for IS-1 is higher than that for
IS-2.
76. Contract Demand (CD) is a firm service that provides gas up to a specific maximum daily
15
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hand, interruptible customers only have a right to gas or transportation
to the extent that it is available.
To some extent these vending arrangements reflect of the costs in-
curred by a pipeline in providing service. Demand related costs are re-
lated to maintenance of the capacity necessary to meet a customer's peak
demand. Commodity-related costs concern the total amount of gas or
transportation service actually provided." Both are variable costs which
are often classified as commodity-related. Public utility78 regulators re-
peatedly question the break-down of tariffs, for instance, whether fixed
costs should also be classified as commodity-related and, if so, then what
percentage.
A. Brokerage and Transportation Functions
Deregulation in Canada and the United States refers broadly to a
market-oriented approach in transportation and sale arrangements con-
cerning natural gas. The FTA may arguably make this approach both
paramount and permanent by restricting the ability of producing juris-
dictions to meddle in pricing matters. As a result of the market-oriented
emphasis, new participants, called "independent brokers," are challeng-
ing the traditional dominance of the "system gas" pipeline-distributor
arrangement.
Non-system gas is gas owned by producers who have not contracted
to supply a pipeline or the pipeline's marketing subsidiary. Direct pro-
ducer sales avoid or "bypass" pipelines in a legal (as opposed to physical)
sense.79 They reach the burner-tip without even having been purchased
by a pipeline. Direct sales are distinguished since gas ownership is not
vested in the pipeline company that provides transportation service (T-
service) for the contracting parties."0 In order for direct sales of non-
quantity. The buyer must pay a monthly demand charge regardless of the volume taken and a
commodity charge for the volume actually taken.
77. Bernhardt, supra note 42, at 758 ("Since the early 1950s, the FPC (now the FERC) gener-
ally has classified some portion of the fixed costs as commodity-related. That portion has ranged
from a high of 75% under the United method to a low of perhaps 25% under the modified fixed-
variable method.").
78. Public utilities in the United States include gas, electricity, telecommunications, and fresh
water supplies, as well as other industries such as sewage, toll bridges, and warehouses.
79. Angyal & Means, supra note 40, at 2.
80. See NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD, MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA, NATU-
RAL GAS MARKET ASSESSMENT 1989-1991 9, 100 (1989).
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system gas to compete with system gas sales81 in central and eastern Can-
ada, access to the Transcanada Pipeline Ltd. System (TCPL) must be
available to all shippers on similar terms and conditions.
Normally, the pipeline operates in two capacities, as both distribu-
tor-carrier and as marketer-broker. In a direct sale, the producer may
sell its gas to the end user or to a distributor or independent marketer
even though the producer does not sell it to a pipeline.8 2 Direct sales
have their own respective opportunity cost and generally affect pipeline
rates. The structure of pipeline rate design (apportioning the burden of a
utility's revenue needs among customer classes) can have a dramatic ef-
fect on the operation of the gas industry.83
For example, an end user might buy gas from a producer in Alberta
and contractually take ownership of the gas immediately east of the Al-
berta/Saskatchewan border. Here, the producer would be responsible
for arranging a Province of Alberta removal permit to obtain transporta-
tion on the NOVA pipeline system (hence becoming the shipper). The
end user would be the shipper on the TransCanada pipeline and local
distribution systems, which would have to make separate arrangements
for back-stopping and with a distributor for any required storage or load
balancing.84 Thus the challenge of U.S. and Canadian natural gas utility
regulators is to promote the public interest in their respective jurisdic-
tions without resorting to protectionism. This is the broad form of mis-
chief that the ETA seeks to remedy.
B. Take-or-Pay
Prior to deregulation and the ETA, the pricing of natural gas as a
81. System gas sales (vente du gaz du rseau) encompass gas sold by pipeline companies of their
affiliates. For instance, TransCanada Pipelines is the major transmission system in Canada, ex-
tending from Alberta to Quebec. It buys and sells more gas from its subsidiary, Western Gas Mar-
keting Ltd. (WGML), than any other Canadian company.
82. An independent marketer is a party other than a pipeline or distributor that buys and re-
sells gas. An independent marketer differs from a marketer in that an it takes title to the gas. The
distinction between a pipeline and a distribution company is not clear in all cases. Some pipelines
also operate distribution grids, and some companies that are considered to be distribution companies
operate transmission lines to link separate distribution grids or to carry gas from a pipeline to the
distribution grid.
83. Richard J. Pierce Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
63, 83-84 (1982).
84. Load factor is the ratio of the average load over a designated period of time to the con-
tracted maximum load, expressed as a percentage. Balancing refers to obligations requiring pipeline
transportation customers to maintain equity between gas inserted and withdrawn from the pipeline
with reference to specified tolerances and time periods.
1993]
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commodity was regulated by the U.S. and Canadian governments by ref-
erence to the price of oil, an alternative fuel. Price regulation created a
business environment that masked the market signals of supply and de-
mand. Large "system pipelines" benefitted from the predictability of
long term supply contracts upstream, coupled with firm distribution con-
tracts downstream to local distribution companies. Competition was
thwarted by preventing direct sales or third party access to distribution
grids.
Transportation of a direct producer sale volume can affect rates
since an opportunity cost arises when the pipeline could refuse transpor-
tation and substitute system gas. If the pipeline itself would otherwise
have made the sale, transportation of the direct producer sale gas will not
change the pipeline's throughput, the total volume being transported at
any one time. In contrast, however, direct sales result in a shift from
sales volume to transportation volume. The impact of such a shift on a
pipeline and its customers depends on its transportation and sales tariffs
and on the pipeline's fixed costs. 85 End-user rates are also affected by the
relationship of transportation tariffs to sales (commodity) tariffs. This
reason is arguably more important in the United States intrastate market
because of the denser pipeline network and the probability of alternative
transportation routes.8 6 Take-or-pay contract exposure also significantly
affects rates.
Sellers were often compensated via take-or-pay contracts for long-
term dedication of a particular gas supply to a particular purchaser.
These purchasers would buy gas from all producers in a particular field
at relatively uniform prices. Today, a new philosophy exists among vari-
ous interest groups in both countries in response to "system gas" opera-
tors and producers, who are not willing to share markets. This follows
the relatively new circumstances where short term contracts are more
common, and purchasers are willing to buy gas from one producer. An
array of prices, commonly characterized in deliverability/best efforts
contracts, currently exist due to deregulation and the over-supply of gas
on the market.87 The increase in the variety of prices and transportation
options requires responsible regulation that can adapt to the new com-
mercial exigencies.
85. Angyal & Means, supra note 40, at 32-33.
86. Id.
87. LEGAL EDUCATION SoCIETY OF ALBERTA, OIL & GAS OPERATING AGREEMENTS: CON-
VENTIONAL, FRONTIER AND INTERNATIONAL App. B at 79 (1991).
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C. Rate Base and Marginal Costs
In order to calculate the maximum rates that a utility may levy, it is
necessary first to determine the utility's operating expenses and rate base.
A firm's rate base is the value of its facilities and capital investments and
assets employed in rendering the service. This figure is multiplied by
another parameter called the rate of return, which is a percentage of the
former figure. The product of the equation is the amount or allowable
return that a regulated monopoly will be permitted to earn and, by impli-
cation, to pass on to its investors.8" Thus a major issue in regulatory
hearings is the equitable evaluation of the capital used in the venture.
Unlike Canada, the United States has provisions in its Constitution
protecting property rights, and these have presented unique constitu-
tional challenges regarding the method of evaluating a firm's rate base.
An early appellate decision held that owners of private property were
protected from rate regulation that had the effect of expropriating it
without just compensation or without due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The maximum rates were based upon the
"fair value" test, which included reference to the present replacement
cost of the property, the original construction costs less depreciation, the
market value of its stocks and bonds, as well as the estimated earning
capacity under particular statutory rates.89
Most states do not continue to follow this rate base evaluation
method, which is itself a compromise between two other competing tests.
The United States Supreme Court no longer requires a detailed rate base
formula predicated upon the "fair value" test. The prevailing rule states
that it is the result reached and not the method employed that is the
main factor in determining "just and reasonable rates." 90 Presently, the
matter involves economics and the selection of a formula to cope with
the effect of inflation on assets. One way is to determine the replacement
cost of installing equipment, but this technique can result in a book value
greater than the original costs. The FERC and most state commissions
espouse the calculation of the original cost of assets less depreciation,
even though this method may tend to lower the book values. 91
When viewed mathematically, the rate level of a firm may be ex-
pressed as its operating expenses plus its rate base, as multiplied by the
88. A. J. G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 138-142 (1969).
89. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
90. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S 591, 601-03 (1944).
91. LEONARD W. WEISS & ALLYN D. STRICKLAND, REGULATION: A CASE APPROACH 16
(1976).
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percentage figure termed rate of return. A rate level does not determine
the specific rates that will be levied nor their interrelationship, as this
parameter is found in the rate structure. This latter concept is also re-
ferred to as rate design, and it apportions the specific rates that are
chargeable to various categories of customers.92
The objective of a utility's rate structure is to meet its financial needs
and to distribute this burden equitably amongst its customers, while dis-
couraging waste of the service and encouraging optimal use. Other crite-
ria include rates that are simple, understandable, publicly acceptable, and
that eschew undue discrimination.93 But these criteria often represent
conflicting exigencies. Inevitably, the rate structure represents a compro-
mise among these factors, and it can be restructured from time to time to
alter the distribution of the system's benefits.
Individual rates involve the subject of microeconomics and the rela-
tionship between marginal cost and price. Marginal cost is that cost in-
curred from the production of another incremental unit or alternatively
the savings gained by avoiding production of that unit. Given that the
economy has a finite capacity for production at any one time, an oppor-
tunity cost "for the alternatives that must be forgone"94 exists from the
choice to produce more or less of a particular service or good. By pro-
ducing more of one particular service, society makes a corollary decision
to produce less of another. A rate structure should reflect marginal costs
if consumers are to make intelligent purchase decisions, since demand for
more or less of an item must reflect the supply cost of more or less.95
Marginal costs involve the variable production expenses that pertain
to a to a particular service or item, such as a widget. The direct produc-
tion expenses contemplated by the marginal cost formula are distin-
guished from the overall production or constant costs, which are not
affected by additional or reduced widget production. The latter costs are
fixed because they are not dependent on or proportionate to variations in
output. They are sometimes referred to as joint costs, and may include
the indirect and non-attributable costs of two or more types of natural
gas service to various classes of customers from one pipeline system.96
Rate structures in use have tended to avoid the fully distributed, or
92. ToMAIN, supra note 36, at 112-15.
93. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 291-93.
94. 1 KAHN, supra note 43, at 66.
95. Id. at 65-66.
96. WILLIAM K. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 191-95 (2d ed.
1976).
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average cost, measurement in the setting of rates, even though it provides
a straightforward mechanism that can yield the required aggregate reve-
nue for a firm. One disadvantage of the method is its relatively arbitrary
allocation of joint costs among customers. Marginal cost rate-setting ap-
pears more desirable due to its efficiency in the allocation of resources.97
Nevertheless, marginal cost pricing is difficult to apply to a regulated
natural monopoly because it does not allow for the recovery of fixed costs
when these are high and the marginal costs are very small. Some ele-
ments of marginal cost pricing may be used in the rate schedule in order
to elicit more customers, thereby keeping the overall costs down; how-
ever, it cannot be used as the sole pricing criterion.
Furthermore, it is not easy to calculate this parameter since regu-
lated firms usually set "different prices for different classes of customers,
different amounts of service purchased," and different time periods. 98
Components of natural gas marginal-cost rates include charges for the
volume of gas purchased and fixed administration costs such as connec-
tion and metering. These rates also proportionally comprise the natural
gas plant costs incurred in providing service capacity to the customer at
peak periods such as winter, when demand is greater than in summer.99
Hence, a pervasive criterion of public utility rates is that they cover
the "value-of-the-service." 10 The difficulty in arriving at this value is the
subject of public regulatory hearings where intervenors regularly utilize
complex socio-economic and financial data to advocate the position of
their respective interest groups. Much effort is directed to the examina-
tion of technical data in an attempt to tease out proof of undue discrimi-
nation. Admittedly, discrimination can not be prevented entirely, as
shown by the disproportional contribution to aggregate revenues made
by the divergent rates of different customer groups. Once all the consid-
erations are made, discrimination may indeed be socially desirable, for
example, in order to distribute gas under postage-stamp like rates even
when a cost analysis made between city and country users does not jus-
tify it. 101 Regulators must therefore decide when the analysis as a whole
justifies discrimination and under what circumstances it does not.
Marginal cost-based rates are not the only alternative to fully-dis-
tributed rates. Certain discriminatory rates-block rates or multi-part
97. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 5, at 194-97.
98. STRICKLAND & WEISS, supra note 91, at 18.
99. Id. at 20-21.
100. PRIEST, supra note 88, at 337.
101. Id. at 344-45.
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rates-exist, yet they do not have "all of the consumer-rationing advan-
tages of un-qualified marginal-cost pricing.""1 2 While marginal-cost
rates may be theoretically more efficient in the short run, they must be
qualified by the expectation of consumers that utility rates will remain
stable for a relatively long time. Accordingly, some regulatory commen-
tators and economists believe that a rate design should be based on per-
sistent or long-run marginal costs. They argue that stability in rates
would be encouraged, but acknowledge both the inherent problems in
estimating cost functions for twenty years or more and the long-term
marginal cost assumption that the output rate will be enhanced indefi-
nitely following an increase in plant capacity.10 3
Dissatisfaction with strict long-run or short-run marginal-cost pric-
ing has resulted in the use of a notable rate setting technique. This popu-
lar alternative derives from joint costs incurred by natural gas utilities in
the capital-intensive construction of pipelines and compressor stations,
and acquiring of rights of way. Although their fixed overhead costs are
relatively high, their incremental costs are relatively low. "In such an
industry, prices set to equal to the incremental cost of increasing produc-
tion or services by another unit will not earn enough revenue to cover
fixed overhead costs .... A long run policy of incremental or marginal
cost pricing will therefore not be possible in such an industry."'"
In order to pay the so-called wages of capital, and in order to mini-
mize the inefficiency, regulators advocate discriminatory prices among
various customer classes according to a structure that is the inverse of
the normal demand elasticity curve. 105 For example, natural gas utilities
might set low rates for industrial users because such customers may
switch to alternative competing fuels if gas is priced at a higher rate.
Despite making an allowance for the actual costs in serving divergent
classes of customers, higher rates are usually levied to residential and
commercial customers because their demand is less elastic."0 6 Since
these classes of customers place a greater value on gas service, they pay a
higher share of the fixed costs than do industrial users, who place less
value on the service. Given the inability of incremental costs to cover
average costs (due to high fixed costs), the justification for this form of
102. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 395.
103. Id. at 319, 400-02.
104. BREYER & STEWART, supra note 18, at 514.
105. Id. at 516.
106. STRICKLAND & WEISS, supra note 91, at 22.
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regulatory price discrimination is to minimize allocative waste while re-
covering or paying for fixed investment.10
7
Public utilities are often in an environment or economy of scale that
fosters long run decreasing costs, with the unit cost decreasing as total
output increases. 10 8 Thus, another example of price discrimination that
has been justified by regulatory agencies is the traditional declining block
rate. This structure initially charges customers a rate sufficient to cover
fixed costs as well demand and customer costs. It is designed to pay for
the entire service cost by both small and large users, yet it encourages
greater consumption by lowering the rates as more of the commodity is
used.109 Rate discrimination between classes of customers is therefore
justified in many instances due to the economic exigencies of the natural
monopoly.
Finally, the Canadian natural gas utilities invariably conduct dis-
criminatory practices without being tainted by the connotation that the
word "discrimination" normally affords. However, not all forms of dis-
crimination in effect are acceptable, and indeed some types may be pa-
tently unfair to certain classes of customers while unjustly benefitting
others. Regulators have a duty to identify and prohibit undue or unjust
discrimination. The goal of regulation is to provide maximum cost sav-
ings to all natural gas users while ferreting out instances of undue price
discrimination. Unfortunately, such instances may have been inadver-
tently exacerbated by the Canadian deregulation of prices for the
commodity.110
IV. REGULATORY METHODOLOGY
Apportionment of commodity and transportation costs is an addi-
tional concern facing regulatory authorities. This is realized outside
North America, where the European Commission suggests that a Com-
munity "purchase price for natural gas" would promote competition.11 '
This would be predicated upon price transparency, the obligation of un-
dertakings to make known the prices they charge. Its predominant pur-
pose is to prevent price discrimination, though it remains to be seen
107. BREYER & STEWVART, supra note 18, at 515-16.
108. STRICKLAND & WEISS, supra note 91, at 22-23.
109. ToMAIN, supra note 36, at 117-18.
110. Alexander J. Black, Canadian Natural Gas Deregulation: Contractual Impediments and
Discriminatory Consequences, 7 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 42-73 (1989).
111. A now dated summary of European Community natural gas initiatives appears in Alexan-
der J. Black, Common Carriage of European Natural Gas and Relevant Canadian Experience, 8 OIL
& GAS L. TAX'N REv. 195-207 (1990).
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whether there is support in Community law for such a policy.112 The
potential sophistication of such a policy is illustrated by a recent Cana-
dian decision.
Despite the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the North Ameri-
can gas industry is focusing on the regulatory impact of freely negotiated
contracts. The TCPL had applied to the NEB for approval to expand its
pipeline system to serve growing domestic and export (American) mar-
kets. On November 6, 1990, the NEB released the Iroquois decision 1 3
on toll design and economic feasibility pertaining to the TCPL's 1991-92
expansion project. The Board decided to hear these issues as a matter of
procedure, before addressing the facilities expansion issue, including ap-
plications for export licenses. The proposed $2.6 billion transportation
facilities include construction of a 1,592 kilometers of pipeline, and in-
stallation of twenty-one new compressor units and two new compressor
stations. The pipeline will run parallel to its existing system in Saskatch-
ewan, Manitoba and Ontario, except for a new 4.5 kilometer pipeline at
Iroquois, Ontario, 1 4 which will accommodate volumes destined for the
American Northeast.
The NEB decided to continue the rolled-in-tolling1 5 regime for new
112. Ernst-Joachim Mestmgcker, Natural Gas in the European Internal Market: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Carriage and Price Transparency, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691, 748-49 (1990). "A
gas spot market can be achieved only in a highly competitive wellhead market and by means of a
diversified common carriage system covering the whole country." Id. at 706.
113. National Energy Board Reasons for Decision, TransCanada Pipelines Ltd, GH-5-89 Vol-
ume 1, Tolling and Economic Feasibility, (Nov. 1990); see also National Energy Board Reasons for
Decision, IPL Facilities and Tolls Application, GHW-5-90, RH-3-90 (Feb. 1991).
114. Paul C. Hillard, Iroquois: IPAA Strives for Equity: Independent Petroleum Association of
America Objects to Importing of Canadian Natural Gas to New England, 60 PETROLEUM INDEPEND-
ENT 9 (1990). The IPAA argued before the FERC that the Iroquois proposal was highly discrimina-
tory against domestic gas producers. Commentators say that
[i]f the Iroquois line is built because of an advantageous rate structure [that favors Cana-
dian gas,] Canadian gas producers will be the primary gas suppliers to the Northeast, and
U.S. suppliers will be the suppliers of second choice, or the swing suppliers to that area as
they now are in California-where Canadian gas fills 40% of the market.
Id.
115. U.S. Incremental Pricing: Until it was repealed in May 1987, Title II of the Natural Gas
Policy Act (NGPA) established a program of incremental pricing of interstate gas supplies. NGPA,
Pub. L. No. 100-42, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (1982) (until repeal in 1987). Under traditional Com-
mission ratemaking, all customers reimburse the pipeline for its average cost of gas acquisition. This
"rolled-in" pricing rolls all of the variously priced gas supplies of the pipeline into an average price,
which is then passed on to the pipeline's customers. The repealing legislation provided that the
Commission's incremental pricing rule would continue in effect "only with respect to the flow
through of costs incurred before the enactment of this section, including any surcharges based on
such costs." See also National Energy Board, Reasons for Decision, Blackhorse Extension, GH-R-
1-92, TransCanada Pipelines Ltd., Blackhorse Extension (June 1992), at 6 (approving a rolled-in
toll). In this decision, the Board noted that:
[iThe costs of any portion of an integrated pipeline system, which is jointly used by many
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facilities, rejecting industry proposals for incremental tolls, which would
cause the new traffic to bear a substantially higher toll than the existing
traffic. Also rejected was a proposal putting the American Northeast traf-
fic in a separate rate base. The Board found that all shippers, both ex-
isting and new, "caused" the expansion.
This finding was necessary to dispose of the incremental tolls propo-
sal which would require the new shippers to bear the expansion costs
based on the cost responsibility principle of toll making. Incremental
tolls for new shippers would shield existing shippers from the costs re-
sulting from the new facilities. This undesirable proposal was based on
the premise that existing shippers had some "acquired rights" on the sys-
tem. The Board opined that previous tollpayers have no acquired rights,
they cannot expect to be exempted from a toll increase simply because
they have paid tolls in the past.
The Board found that different, less favorable toll treatment of new
shippers (and toll protection for existing ones), solely on the basis of
when they commenced service, would be discriminatory. Mitigating the
impact on existing shippers was effectively found not to be a valid objec-
tive in toll-making. Many existing shippers are locked into long term
contracts and cannot extricate themselves should they not wish to pay
higher tolls. Nevertheless, this extreme position downplays the role that
existing shippers have in the financing of earlier pipeline expansions.1 16
A. Traditional Rate-of-Return Regulation
Rate-of-return regulation is the predominant method of North
American regulatory control against public utility-monopoly abuse.
Rate-setting and policing or enforcement of rates impose significant costs
on a regulated natural monopoly. 1 7 Regulation tends to impose high
costs on both administrators and management. Requiring a "reasonable"
rate-of-return on productive capital assets can inefficiently encourage
shippers and which provides a standard service, should be shared by all system users
through rolled-in tolls. Rolled in tolls reflect the fact that all shippers cause costs on the
system and that all shippers also share the benefits of the integrated system. In such cir-
cumstances, rolled-in tolls send the correct market signals to shippers with respect to the
cost of providing the service.
Id.
116. NAT. GAS REG. NEWSL. (J. Thomas Brett, Johnston & Buchan, Barrisfers &' Solicitors,
Ottawa), Nov. 1990.
117. Natural monopoly is defined as a state of market in which a single firm can produce the
desired output at a lower cost than any combination of two or more firms. See HAZLETr, THE
CURIOUS EVOLUTION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY THEORY (1985); UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES-
THE CASE FOR DEREGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES 1, 16 (Robert W. Poole, Jr., ed.).
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capital expenditures and decrease incentives to minimize costs.118
Rate-of-return regulation in the U.S. typically monitors prices, qual-
ity of services, cross-subsidies, and terms of transactions between affili-
ates; determines depreciation policies, entry and exit conditions; and
reviews expenses.1 9 In order to calculate the maximum rates that a util-
ity may levy, it is necessary to first determine its operating expenses and
rate base.120 A firm's rate base is the value of its facilities and capital
investments and assets employed in rendering the service. This figure is
multiplied by another parameter called the rate of return, which is a per-
centage of the former figure and should be consistent with the risk to
which capital is exposed. The product of the equation is the amount or
allowable return that a regulated monopoly will be permitted to earn and
by implication, pass on to investors in the concern.121
The rate level of a firm may be expressed as its operating expenses
plus, its rate base as multiplied by the percentage figure termed rate of
return. It does not comprise the specific rates that will be levied nor their
inter-relationship as this parameter is found in the rate structure. This
latter concept is also referred to as rate design, and it apportions the
specific rates that are chargeable to various categories of customers.1 22
The objective of a utilities' rate structure is to meet its financial needs, yet
distribute this burden equitably amongst its customers, while discourag-
ing waste of the service and encouraging optimal use. Other criteria in-
clude rates that are simple, understandable, publicly acceptable and that
eschew undue discrimination. 123
118. Bernhardt, supra note 42, at 762. "A system of pipeline regulation is warranted only if four
conditions are met: (1) some unregulated pipeline companies would exercise substantial market
power, resulting in significant resource misallocation; (2) the regulation would substantially increase
the efficiency of resource allocation in those markets; (3) the regulation is not overly expensive; and(4) no alternative system would cause a greater efficiency increase or be less costly." Id.
119. Sushil K. Bhattacharyya & Dan J. Laughhunn, Price Cap Regulation: Can We Learn From
the British Telecom Experience, 120 PuB. UTIL FORT. 22, 27 (1987).
120. "[A]lthough the consumer sees only a single aggregate charge, to ensure that pipeline com-
panies cover their costs with a fair return, the FERC must estimate the costs separately and regulate
pipeline charges for each component." Bernhardt, supra note 42, at 768.
121. PRIEST, supra note 88, at 138-42.
122. TOMAIN, SUPRA note 36, at 112-15; see supra discussion at Part III.C.
123. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 11. Bonbright adds that:
The familiar statement that a public utility is a 'natural monopoly' is meant to indicate that
this type of business, by virtue of its inherent technical characteristics rather than by virtue
of any legal restrictions or financial power, cannot be operated with efficiency and economy
unless it enjoys a monopoly of its market. So great are the diseconomies of direct competi-
tion that, even if it gets an effective start, the competition will probably not long persist if
only because it will lead to the bankruptcy of the rivals. But even if competition is long
lived, as has occasionally happened when rivalry has taken a restrained form, it is wasteful
of resources because it involves unnecessary duplication of tracks, of cables, of substations,
etc.
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B. Price Cap Regulation
Price capping is more than just a cap that fixes prices at their pres-
ent levels, subject to certain adjustments. Rather, it is a control system
that attempts to adjust for purchase prices of inputs that the company
buys. Price cap regulation has been called "social contract" regulation 124
and is respectively employed by the British Office of Telecommunications
(OFTEL) and the Office of Gas Supply (OFGAS).
The OFTEL formula was based on recommendations by Professor
Littlechild, who proposed a local tariff reduction scheme under which a
local tariff index would increase over a twelve-month period at a rate
equal to the retail price index (RPI),125 less a fixed percentage. The tariff
would be applied to a basket of services. Nevertheless, profitability and
rate-of-return remain valid concerns when the price cap allows profits
that are publicly perceived to be excessive, or when it constrains the reg-
ulated industry's ability to earn a reasonable rate of return.126
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has implemented price cap regulation where developing technol-
ogy offers room for productivity improvements. 27 A supporting report
identified potential benefits including, "ratepayer protection promotion
of service efficiency and technological innovation, reduction, if not elimi-
nation of incentives to cross subsidize; and administrative simplicity."' 28
However, the price regulatory regime in the United Kingdom has not
necessarily prevented the British Gas monopoly from arguably "gold-
plating" its system by building it to an unnecessarily high standard and
cost. 129
Price capping does not differ from rate-of-return (ROR) regulation
in the totality of controls imposed, but rather differs in the "primary
Id. at 291-93; see supra discussion at Part III.C.
124. Jack L. Landau, Social Contract Regulation is a Bad Bargain for Ratepayers, 120 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 21 (1987).
125. The RPI's equivalent in the United States is the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
126. Bhattacharyya & Laughhunn, supra note 119, at 26; Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalen-
see, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. REG. 1, 33 (1986). The authors note that
"[b]road-based indexes like the CPI are designed to measure the general average rate of price
changes; they are not especially sensitive to the price of any particular utility's inputs. [Additionally,
there is no] obvious way to come up with good, simple estimates of expected productivity growth."
Id.
127. The FCC adopted a cap on AT&T's rates on May 8, 1989. FCC Policy and Rules Concern-
ing Rates for Dominant Carriers, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,836 (May 8, 1989).
128. FCC Proposes Replacing Rate of Return Regulation for Dominant Carriers with Price Cap
Regulation for Interstate Services, FCC Docket 87-303 (1987); Bhattacharyya & Laughhunn, supra
note 119, at 23.
129. OFFICE OF GAs SUPPLY (LONDON, HMSO), OFGAS ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1991).
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control instrument used and the relative emphasis given to the remain-
der." Rate-of-return regulation focuses on profit control with secondary
attention paid to prices and other parameters of performance. Hearings
traditionally debate the exclusions or inclusions of expenses from the rate
base and the degree of price dissagregations for ROR compliance.
Alternatively, the current British price capping model focuses on
the overall price control for protected services, with subsequent attention
to profitability and performance parameters. Price capping disputes focus
on the suitability of inflation measure(s), the "appropriate offset to reflect
productivity," and the nature of the protected services. However, diffi-
culties would exist in implementing price caps in North American juris-
dictions because much of the ROR regulatory control system would have
to be dismantled. 131
Ironically, the RPI-X price capping method is closer to rate-of-re-
turn regulation than government proponents suggest. Both price and
profits regulation create perverse incentives.
[P]rice regulation creates pressure to reduce quality of service; profit
regulation, which normally allows a reasonable rates of return, some-
how defined, on investment, does little to encourage cost reduction.
Price regulation... involves controlling quality by setting service stan-
dards, while cost regulation involves the review of the prudence of the
regulated entity's expenditures. 13 1
Moreover, tensions between the regulated company and the regulator
will be inevitable. While the use of price capping or rate-of-return regu-
lation both have respective merits and demerits, both methods are capa-
ble being enhanced.
V. THE CASE FOR INCENTIVE RATE REGULATION
Traditional rate-of-return regulation 32 arguably creates an environ-
ment where efficiency is penalized and incompetence (in the form of
130. Bhattacharyya & Laughhunn, supra note 119, at 28.
131. Irwin Stelzer, Britain's Newest Import: Americas Regulatory Experience, 4 OXFORD REV.
ECON. PoL'Y 69, 70 (1988).
132. See generally Alexander J. Black, Public Utilities and Regulatory Theory, 1 OIL & GAS: L.
TAX'N REv. 12-16 [1989/1990]; Alexander J. Black, Canadian Natural Gas Deregulation: Contrac-
tual Impediments and Discriminatory Consequences, 7 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCEs L. 42-73
(1989).
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overcapitalization) rewarded. 13 3 Using a cost-plus basis to determine to-
tal revenue requirements ensures that all expenses (cost-of-service) 3 will
be reimbursed along with the allowed return on equity provided that
these costs are deemed "prudent." These costs are escalating. For in-
stance, tighter environmental standards are forced on firms subject to
rate-of-return regulation. By 1981, approximately one-third of U.S. envi-
ronmentally-related spending was made by public utilities. With inelas-
tic demand price, state regulatory commissions invariably allowed
utilities to pass on the extra costs to customers.135  Yet traditional rate-
of-return regulation perversely discourages incentives by generally
preventing the retention of any gains from greater productivity. 136
On the other hand, an incentive approach (including the bonus or
gainsharing system used in unregulated companies) can permeate the
company organization, changing the motivations and behavior of corpo-
rate personnel. 137 Well settled principles of public utility regulation re-
quire that efficiency be monitored and that rewards and penalties be
133. The Averch & Johnston hypothesis suggests that getting a rate higher than the market rate
of return on capital from a regulatory commission encourages an imore efficient use of capital. Pub-
lic utility regulation encourages inefficient use of capital, including the choice of capital-intensive
technologies, because increasing the use of capital will increase revenues and profits. See Averch &
Johnston, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECOM. REV. 1052 (1962); see
also E. BAILEY, ECONOMIC THEORY OF REGULATORY CONSTRAINT 4 (1973) (positing that the
standard result under Averch-Johnson "is that the firm has an incentive to misallocate resources by
substituting capital for labor in production, and that this misallocation is strictly preferred by the
firm to any padding of the rate base.").
134. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 262. Bonbright comments that
as long as rates are fixed so as to assure even a company under mediocre management that
it can cover its costs, including a 'fair rate of return,' and as long as any higher return is
denied even to a company under exceptionally able management, there will be lacking
under regulated private ownership a stimulus for efficiency comparable to the stimulus for
efficiency of actual competition.
Professor Bonbright suggests that substandard service has been prevented by regulatory lags and the
prevention of companies from receiving excessive earnings for prolonged periods. See also Paul V.
Nolan, Progress of Regulation: Trends and Topics, 108 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 50 (1981) (stating that in
1981, Michigan and Massachusetts were quite active in developing efficiency programs).
135. Robert W. Crandall, Pollution Controls and Productivity Growth in Basic Industries, in PRO-
DUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 349-52 (Thomas G. Cowing & Rodney E.
Stevenson eds., 1981).
136. Harry M. Trebing, Toward an Incentive System of Regulation, 71 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 22. n. 1
(1963) (citing GARDINER C. MEANS, PRICING, POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 191 (1962))
(dismissing utility-type regulation as a method of compelling a high level of performance in the steel
industry because "it greatly weakens the profit pressure for economic efficiency.").
137. KURT A. STRASSER & MARK F. KOHLER, REGULATING UTILITIES WITH MANAGEMENT
INCENTIVES: A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 137 & ch.5 generally (1989). Alterna-
tively, rate capping is a "crude investment tool at best" without an accurate measurement of poten-
tial productivity. This productivity measurement is difficult to obtain. Accordingly, in the United
States, rate capping has been seriously considered only in the telecommunications industry, in which
potential exists for substantial improvements to productivity because of new technological advances.
Id. at 67.
1993]
29
Black: Responsible Regulation: Incentive Rates for Natural Gas Pipelines
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:349
conferred for appropriate performance. 1 3  Increased motivation is
needed as North America moves commercially towards a single gas mar-
ket without the guidance of a firm North American Gas Policy. Regula-
tory restructuring in North America created a market shake-up or
dislocation characterized by substantial (take-or-pay) contract costs and
externalities.13 9 However, one important caveat exists. Incentive rate
regulation, like other forms of regulation can never be a perfect substitute
for the invisible hand of competition. 'I Nevertheless, incentive rate reg-
ulation indeed may be a timely and efficient response to these changed
circumstances.
A. Regulatory Lag
Admittedly, exceptions exist from the general criticism that rate-of-
return regulation stifles innovative performance. For instance, tax cred-
its and accelerated depreciation can combine to result in a higher rate of
return after tax has been computed than before. This can occur when the
taxpayer has "income from other sources or when some mechanism ex-
ists for transferring those tax incentives that cannot currently be used by
the taxpayer."1 4' However, regulatory lag involves lack of continuity
138. Alfred E. Kahn, Public Utility Productivity, iii (1975). Kahn notes that:
[p]ublic utility regulation is inherently incapable of supplying the kind of continuous pres-
sure and incentive for efficient operation that we rely on competition to supply in nonregu-
lated industries . . . .A regulatory commission has an obligation ... to monitor the
efficiency of the companies that it regulates and to... devise rewards and penalties related
to the efficiency with which those companies perform .... The first step in carrying out
such responsibilities is the devising of the systems for assessing and measuring efficiency.
Id
139. See GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 5, at 55. For example, a tortfeasor's actions impose
external costs upon the victim even though the relationship between the tortfeasor and the victim is
involuntary. In voluntary relationships, such as contracts, legal rules that are ambiguous or in a
state of flux can also impose external costs. The allocative efficiency of competition assumes that all
product costs are incurred by a producing firm and that all benefits are respectively reflected in its
revenues. Some costs or benefits called beneficial and detrimental externalities are in fact not re-
flected in the firm's costs and revenues. These include pollution effects. See also John Baden &
Richard Stroup, Externality, Property Rights, and the Management of Our National Forest, 16 J. L.
& EcoN. 303 (1973) (noting that current forest management policies leave problems of inefficiency
and inequity unresolved).
140. The classic free enterprise argument is that efficient allocation of resources (and hence pub-
lic welfare) can be enhanced by behavior that seeks to further private interests where the actors are
led "as if by an invisible hand, to seek an end which was no part of their intention." ADAM SMITH,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (7th ed. 1793); Paul W. MacAvoy et al., Is Competitive Entry Free?
Bypass and PartialDeregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6 YALE J. REG. 209, 230 (1989) ("Conflict-
ing regulatory jurisdictions do not correspond to the 'invisible hand' of Competition under which
consumers and firms pursue economic objectives. The consequences of competing regulations can
include increased regulatory intervention in markets, greater administrative costs, and unnecessary
delays in certification of new entrants.").
141. Eymes, supra note 16; see E. Cary Brown, Business Income Taxation and Investment Incen-
tives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 300 (1948).
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and a hiatus between regulatory decisions. Innovation and efficiency can
occur "if the return on investment, as a residual after expenses," is not to
be lost. The profit motive may also operate during regulatory lag, when
firms behave efficiently in the absence of inflation in order to retain prof-
its pending the next formal rate hearing.142 A fixed price between rate
hearings therefore acts as an efficiency incentive. Inevitably, there is a
delay before regulatory approval and this delay can result in cost re-
straint. 143 When industry costs fall relative to rates, excess profits are
made, as happened in the U.S. electric power industry from 1945 until
the mid-1960s. Since then, rising costs and fixed prices have lowered
profits and the rates cannot match the escalation in costs due to regula-
tory lag. 144
Nevertheless, traditional regulation has limitations. Traditional reg-
ulation may cause a delay in installing new cost reduction technology
since cost this might reduce revenues. Regulated firms also react by in-
flating expenses 14 and investment per unit output, often "gold-plating"
or over-building their infrastructure pursuant to a "cost-plus" strategy.
There is also a bias to boost the rate base through expansion. Under
traditional regulation, utilities earn high returns while increasing the
cost-of-service. This corporate behavior can disguise excessive salaries
and other payments. While innovation is required for survival under the
theory of competition, regulated companies generally eschew capital sav-
ing innovations that reduce either investment or rate base per unit output
(and hence the return per unit output). 146 Over-investment can dilute
the effect of price as a constraint on new business. These price constraints
can be retarded by avoiding the block rate structure, the convergence of
capital costs and allowed rate-of-return, and the factor bias caused by a
142. Trebing, supra note 136, at 25; cf. Elizabeth Warren, The Regulatory Lag Fallacy, 106 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 15, 16 (1980). Warren comments that:
Interestingly, as a utility becomes more efficient, it has more to fear from regulatory lag.
An inefficient utility has many cost reductions available to offset inflation during a period
of regulatory lag. It may choose to implement few or several. By contrast, an efficient
producer has few costs cuts yet to be made. High inflation during a regulatory lag period
may impair the efficient producer's financial integrity, while it permits an inefficient pro-
ducer to maintain relatively higher rates of return if it will simply make some movement
toward increased efficiency. Regulatory lag is at best an undifferentiating device to pro-
mote utility efficiency.
Id.
143. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 53-54.
144. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 16. "In essence, a rate cap is similar to a perma-
nent, institutionalized, and rationalized regulatory lag". Id. at 66.
145. BONBRIGHT, supra note 6, at 262. Escalating costs mean that revenues will also rise.
146. Trebing, supra note 136, at 24.
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fuel adjustment clause (FAG), 147 where prices automatically move up or
down as input costs change. A fuel adjustment clause prevents an other-
wise inherent rigidity in utility pricing by encouraging rapid pass-
through of increased fuel costs. 148 Concurrently, this device facilitates a
savings pass-through to customers. As one author stated, "there is an
inherent rigidity in utility pricing without an automatic cost adjustment
provision." 1 49  Overinvestment is indirectly encouraged when regulators
do not consider economic costs when establishing the rate base, earnings
and prices.150
Thus, while marginal cost pricing is increasingly used in the electric-
ity industry, there are wide areas for discretionary judgement, including
at least four costing methodologies. Over-investment may also be en-
couraged by regulatory commissions that wish to moderate the impact
peak-period price. Another weakened regulatory constraint is the avoid-
ance of incremental tolls because high cost supplemental gas supplies has
been abandoned in favor of a rolled-in tolls.15 1
147. Many jurisdictions permit gas utilities to implement automatic adjustment clauses
("purchased gas adjustment" or "automatic fuel adjustment" clauses) to recover changes in
purchased gas costs. Regulatory agencies often have discretion to allow the passing-through of the
increase to customers with or without a formal public hearing. James McManus, Natural Gas, in
ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS 336, (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel, eds., 1990); see
eg., 16 U.S.C. § 2625(e) (1988); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454.5 (West Supp. 1986) (permitting rate
adjustments for fuel cost increases).
148. Harry M. Trebing, Motivations and Barriers to Superior Performance Under Public Utility
Regulation, in PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 135, at 376.
FACs might encourage, especially in vertically integrated utilities, fuel-intensive rather than capital-
intensive production processes. FACs are also conducive to X-inefficiency (internal slack and
waste). The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 required the FERC to review FACs
every four years to determine whether they provide incentives for efficient resource use.
149. Elizabeth Warren, Regulated Industries'Automatic Cost of Service Adjustment Clauses: Do
They Increase or Decrease Cost to the Consumer?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 333, 336 (1980).
Responsiveness of price to cost is what distinguishes automatic cost adjustment clauses
from escalator clauses, which are usually predetermined increments in utility rates that are
automatically triggered after a certain time has elapsed since the preceding regulatory
hearing.... Whenever utility costs decline or increase they are reflected in an automatic
adjustment in the customers' bill. ... The responsibility of a regulatory commission is to
establish rates that balance consumer and investor interests.
Id. at 336-37; see Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). The
key reason that the interests must be balanced is that the entire premise of regulation is violated if
either interest is short-changed; see also John A. Carver, Developments in Regulations: Adjustment
Clauses, 53 DENV. L.J. 663, 665-68 (1976). Professor Warren suggests that "regulatory lag is at
best, a profit-squeezing device unrelated to real efficiency potential." Warren at 351.
150. Trebing, supra note 151, at 375. Another incentive to overinvestment is the normalization
of taxes associated with accelerated depreciation. Such normalization provides an interest-free loan
to a firm, inducing continued high levels of investment in order to postpone the payback period.
151. Id. at 376. The Federal Power Commission abandoned plans to incrementally price LNG
facilities in favor of a rolled-in price that would average high-cost LNG with low-cost flowing gas.
This diluted the effect of price as a constraint on new business. Columbia LNG Corp, Op. No.622,
47 F.P.C. 1624, 1641 (1972); Columbia LNG Corp, Op. No 622-A, 48 F.P.C. 723, 729 (1972);
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B. Incentive Rate Rationale
Public utilities face uncertainties caused by the regulatory process,
and many of these business uncertainties are not necessarily shared by
unregulated companies.152 Instead of the traditional command-and-con-
trol regulation, incentive regulation can increase goal specificity if the
regulatory commission sets clear goals that will result in definite and un-
ambiguous rewards. 1 3 These goals concern organizational productivity.
Incentive rates promote flexible pricing by public utilities by creating
rates that are above a utility's marginal cost of production yet lower than
its regular charges.
Incentive rates reflect changes in a general price index (such as the
Consumer Price Index) rather than charges to a specific company's costs.
Otherwise, the self-interest seeking behavior of a regulated firm will skew
its efforts towards the narrow parameter at the expense of other perform-
ance indicators. The proposed FERC policy requires incentive ratemak-
ing proposals to be prospective with the Commission establishing "just
and reasonable" rates at the inception of the plan. Secondly, participa-
tion by regulated companies will be voluntary. Thirdly, the benefits of
the incentive rate proposal must be stated clearly in comparison to cost-
of-service regulation. Finally, the FERC seeks quantifiable customer
benefits. 154
Post-World War II North American economic growth has been
aided by productivity advancement, with the regulated industries invari-
ably leading other sectors. Productivity considers "the efficiency with
which inputs are transformed into useful output within the production
process." However, since 1966, productivity growth has slowed down in
both regulated and non-regulated industries. 55 One increasingly used
Trunkline LNG Co. et al., Opinion Nos. 796 & 796-A (1977). The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
incrementally priced high-cost gas with low priority industrial boiler fuel until the price reached
parity with fuel oil: At that time, rolled-in or average cost pricing is reinstated.
152. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 99.
153. Id. at 90-91. Organizations may face ambiguity in their decision-making processes. Orga-
nizations have, for this purpose been defined as "a collection of choices looking for problems, issues
and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues
to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for the work." Id. at 93 n.35 (citing
Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Institutional Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 2).
154. Incentive Regulation Under Review, THE REG. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at 7. The FERC will
invite comment from the electric and gas industries, and subsequently intends to invite companies to
file incentive ratemaking proposals.
155. PRODucrvITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 135, at 3, 6. Pro-
ductivity-regulated industries share supply-related characteristics, including that: (1) possible econ-
omies of scale result "when an equiproportional expansion of all inputs leads to a greater than
proportional expansion in output, or equivalently, when an increase in output at constant input
prices leads to a less than proportional increase in total costs. Thus, average costs decline (increase)
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technique is total factor productivity (TFP). It measures "unexplained
residual" (such as technological advancement): output growth that can-
not be accounted for by growth in inputs." 6
As late as 1963, little had been done to investigate the incentive-
regulation paradigm.15 7 Extreme recommendations in the United States
to use antitrust remedies would either duplicate facilities or reduce econ-
omies of scale. In the absence of clear (and largely achieved) efficiency
standards, total cost per unit output would not be reduced if utility com-
missions increased the rate-of-return 158 in order to spur investment. 5 9
From the turn of the century until the early 1960s, productivity time
measurement has shown that regulated industries in the U.S. have led
productivity growth as compared to other industries. The management
of these entities possesses a greater "corporate consciousness of sense of
public trusteeship" than the public press portrays."'° Paradoxically, "the
inherent logic of cost-plus regulation would indicate that the firm seeking
to raise total receipts would inflate costs or input per unit output.' 61
This ostensible paradox is refuted since operational incentives have
never been widely used, nor has society really defined "optimal or ideal"
as output expands (contracts), and since larger firms would be able to produce at lower average costs
than smaller firms, a competitive equilibrium is not sustainable."; (2) technical changes, including
innovations and increased knowledge, affect maximum or efficient output; (3) the degree of capital
intensity of the production technology affects efficiency.
Demand-side characteristics include pricing and growth policies:
Economic growth makes it possible for the benefits of both economies of scale and embod-
ied technical change to be realized in the form of lower average costs. Pricing in the regu-
lated sector has generally been carried out on the basis of average historical or embedded
costs, rather than marginal costs, thus giving rise to potential allocative distortions, which
must be taken into account when assessing productivity growth.
Id. at 4-6.
156. Thomas C. Cowing et al., Comparative Measures of Total Factor Productivity in the Regu-
lated Sector: The Electric Utility Industry, in PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED IN-
DUSTRIES, supra note 138, at 161; cf. Frank S. Robinson, Total Factor Productivity Studies as a Rate
case Tool, 106 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 19 (1980) (discussing the reasons of the New York State Public
Utilities Commission decision against using mandatory TFP studies in rate cases).
157. Trebing, supra note 136, at 22 n.3 (citing CHARLES S. MORGAN, REGULATION AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1923) and the classic yet dated study whose results are re-
ported therein); MARTIN G. GLAESER, OUTLINES OF PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 432-35 (1923).
158. Bluefield Waterworks and Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 693
(1923). The Court stated "[t]he return should be reasonably sufficient to ensure confidence in the
financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical manage-
ment, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
discharge of its public duties." Id.
159. Trebing, supra note 136, at 23.
160. Id. at 26.
161. Id. at 23.
34
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss3/2
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION
performance. 162 Furthermore, regulatory tribunals are increasingly rec-
ognizing the impact of their decisions upon the environment. Any defini-
tion of performance has to contemplate inter-disciplinary issues wider
than those conventionally associated with regulated industries.
Historically, regulatory incentive plans increased the return in the
face of extraordinary efficiency, reducing return rates for the provision of
poor service.1 63 The other main method is the so-called sliding-scale
concept, where the rate-of-return moves inversely with the customer's
prices. It originated in England in 1855 in order to regulate local gas
companies, was adopted by Consumer's Gas Company of Toronto in
1877, and subsequently was adopted in the U.S. in 1905 by the Boston
Board of gas and Electric Light Commissioners. The longest lasting U.S.
experiment occurred in Washington D.C. from 1925 to 1955.164
Incentive rate regulation schemes are not universally popular.165
Regulatory commissions and indeed utilities often lack vital information.
For instance, compressor fuel is the principal variable input to the trans-
mission process yet it can not be measured accurately. Hence, variable
costs "are assumed to be proportional to either horsepower or line-pipe
capacity." 166 Since utility managers are invariably better informed, this
asymmetry of information gives them "incentive to make their decisions
seem prudent by arguing that poor performance is due exclusively to bad
luck." It is hard to refute these arguments given the disparity in informa-
tion. Consequently, regulators tend only to penalize extremely bad oper-
ating and investment decisions. 167
162. Id.
163. See City of Two Rivers v. Commonwealth Tel. Co., 70 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 5, 11 (Wis.
1947) ("Sound regulation of utility rates... should include a recognition of the fact that a reason-
able share of the savings which result from economy and efficiency of operation should inure to the
utility and such share should be sufficient to constitute an incentive for continued and further effort
directed to such savings.").
164. Trebing, supra note 136, at 28; see I. BUSSING, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 32-33, 53-59
(AMS ed. 1968).
165. CLEMENS, supra note 4, at 352 (1950) ("There is more than a suspicion that premiums for
efficiency result in nothing more than windfall profits for stockholders who are passive, if not indif-
ferent, to the companies' policies.").
166. Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, Capacity Expansion in the U.S. Natural-Gas Pipe-
line Industry, in PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES, supra note 138, at
145, 147 n.8. Natural gas compressor-prime mover units are either reciprocating gas engines or
centrifugal gas turbines. The latter consume a significantly greater amount of fuel per horsepower
generated than the former. Thus fuel consumption cannot be estimated if each firm does not main-
tain an inventory of compressor types.
167. Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 126, at 12. "State commissions sometime refer to cer-
tain regulatory actions as embodying incentive regulation, even though the measures are in fact
merely traditional prudence reviews of one sort or another that reward or penalize a particular
utility after the fact." Id. at 38 n.85. In contrast, true incentive regulation properly refers only to
proactive incentives.
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Another problem with traditional rate-of-return regulation is the
widespread use of average rather than marginal cost pricing. If regula-
tors order that prices must equal average total cost, then short-run sup-
ply and demand conditions will not be properly tracked: prices will
sometimes be too high or too low regardless of efficient operating and
investment decisions."' Thus, "the force dampening incentives is almost
entirely a function of regulatory technique, while the countervailing force
for efficiency is largely a product of factors operating outside or in-
dependent of the ambit of regulation."' 169
Under the so-called "black-letter" rule, regulatory commissions may
review for an abuse of discretion by company management but cannot
usurp the management's discretion in directing company operations.
The task of regulators is to balance the increasing capital costs for in-
creasing risks. 1
70
This means that mandatory incentive rate regulation would proba-
bly need legislative authorization in order to make subsidy payments to
utilities or to fine them. A statutory interpretation presumption exists
against retroactive expropriation and it is possible that an incentive fine
could be characterized as such. Furthermore, it is possible that subsidies
granted to efficiently performing utilities could run foul of the a regula-
tory board's legislative mandate. For example, many parties increasingly
have locus standi for many regulatory related issues, including environ-
mental impact assessment. They could conceivably exercise their inter-
venor 17 ' rights of audience, and they could argue against subsidies as
168. Id. at 13. For a brief treatment of marginal costs, rate-of-return, and utilities regulation, see
Alexander J. Black, Public Utilities and Regulatory Theory, 1 OGTLR 12-16 [1989/1990].
169. Trebing, supra note 136, at 27.
170. Strasser & Kohler, supra note 137, at 18; see Public Serv. Comm'n, 50 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
416 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1982) (quoting Clemens supra note 4, at 128, and commenting on the
"well established legal principal that a commission sits as a regulatory agency and cannot usurp the
functions of management").
Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Ser. Comm'n of West Virginia, 262 U.S.
679 (1923), provides authority for the proposition that the art of devising a just and reasonable rate
of return, requires "efficient and economical management." The Supreme Court held that "[a] pub.
lic utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which
it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and
in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are
attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no constitutional right to profits such as
are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures." Id. at 692; see
also PRIEST, supra note 121, at 206-08.
171. See generally Municipal Elec. Ass'n v. Environmental Assessment Bd., No. 198/91, 1992
Ont. CJ. LEXIS 135 (Feb. 3, 1992). The Municipal Electric Association (MEA) applied for judicial
review of an interim decision by the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board (the Board), which
was conducting protracted hearings into a Demand/Supply Plan Report of Ontario Hydro. The
proposals were intended to ensure a continued and reliable supply of electricity for the province.
Ontario Hydro considered the present facilities inadequate, and the report contemplates planning
[Vol. 28:349
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detrimental to the utilities' public service obligation. Even in a voluntary
measures to the year 2015. Pursuant to the Environmental Assessment Act (EAA), R.S.O. 1980,
c.140 as am., a proposed undertaking by a public body may not proceed unless an environmental
assessment has been submitted to the Minister of the Environment and duly accepted. Alternatively,
pursuant to § 12(2), the Minister can direct the Board to hold hearings with respect to (1) the
acceptance of the environmental assessment; (2) the approval to proceed with the undertaking; and
(3) whether the approval should be given subject to terms and conditions and, if so, the provision of
such terms and conditions. Ontario Hydro submitted its assessment, and a hearing was ordered.
The purpose of the EAA is the betterment of the people of Ontario by providing for the protection,
conservation, and wise management of the environment. "Environment" is defined loosely to in-
lude the social, economic and cultural conditions that influence the life of man or a community.
Ontario Hydro's Demand/Supply Plan Report included an environmental Assessment pursuant
to § 5(3) consisting of: (1) a description of the undertaking; (2) a description and a statement of the
rationale for the undertaking, the alternative methods of carrying out the undertaking, "alternatives
to the undertaking," and a description of the "the actions necessary or that may reasonably be
expected to be necessary to prevent, change mitigate or remedy the effects upon or the effects that
might reasonably be expected upon the environment, by the undertaking, the alternative methods of
carrying out the undertaking and the alternatives to the undertaking." The assessment must also
include "an evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages to the environment." The Intervenor
Funding Project Act (IFPA) defines an intervenor as a person who has been granted that status by
the Board. The statute attempts to provide funding to bona fide interests that may not otherwise be
able participate in proceedings against certain administrative tribunals, including the EAB. Once
intervenor status has been granted, the individual or group may apply to a panel of the Board for
intervenor funding, and § 3 of the IPPA prevents the hearing of substantive matters until the panel
has dealt with all intervenor funding applications. Normally, it is the proponent (in this case Onta-
rio Hydro) that subsidizes the funding award. In this case, over 200 intervenors were given status
before the board for DSP hearings. Twenty-nine received funding totalling $22 million. Energy
Probe Research Foundation, was designated an intervenor, made a funding application, and was
awarded $625,000 by the Funding Panel pursuant to an interim order.
A question arose concerning the relevance of material proposed for presentation by Energy
Probe to the Board. Energy Probe planned to serve as a full-time intervenor, criticizing Hydro's
case, presenting marginal cost pricing concepts, and providing an alternative that would radically
alter Ontario Hydro, induce fundamental institutional reform, and privatize all non-nuclear electric
generating facilities in Ontario. Energy Probe believes that supply should be governed by competitive
market forces. The Funding Panel opined that such a question could be dealt with only by the
Board itself. The full Board subsequently ruled that Energy Probes's alternative to the Ontario
Hydro plan was reasonable and that it should be investigated. Ultimately the court opined that:
The Board has a most difficult task to perform. It is not the environmental impact of a
particular project that [is] being assessed, but rather, a wide-ranging and far-reaching plan
dealing with all the variables associated with a projected supply of electricity for this Prov-
ince over the next quarter of a century. With some 200-plus intervenors and a veritable
potpourri of varied and often conflicting interests, the undertaking must be weighed against
a definition of environment that takes into consideration virtually all aspects of life.
Municipal Elec. Ass'n, 1992 Ont. C.J LEXIS 135 at *15.
Although the Court was dealing only with a preliminary ruling of the Board, it realized the
potential impact of that ruling on the hearing as a whole. The Applicant for Judicial Review, MEA
argued that: (1) The Board exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting Energy Probe to prepare and
present evidence in support of a proposal that is not an alternative to the undertaking or an alterna-
tive method of carrying out the undertaking pursuant to § 5(3) of the EAA; (2) The Board exceeded
its jurisdiction by permitting Energy Probe to prepare and lead evidence in support of the proposal
after the Board had ruled that Energy Probe's proposal was not an alternative method of carrying
out the undertaking; (3) The Board lost jurisdiction because its decision on the motion was patently
unreasonable; and (4) The Board's was contrary to natural justice and in excess of the Board's
jurisdiction. The court dismissed the application, and held that the Board acted fairly, reasonably
and within its jurisdiction.
The Board has wide discretion to hear and consider evidence it deems relevant. It may make
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incentive rate program, legislative authorization would be prudent be-
cause a regulatory board cannot fetter its discretion and sign binding
contracts with regulated companies. 172
Management audits may be ordered by a regulatory tribunal due to
perceived inefficiency or as the condition for a rate increase. Although
utilities view them as an intrusion upon management, they can "restore
public confidence in both the utility and the commission."' 173
Bonuses on the rate-of-return for managerial efficiency may be re-
jected by regulatory commissions given the utility's statutory duty to per-
form efficiently.174 "[E]ffective incentive plans are possible; regulators
can motivate managers to perform better [, and] .... the key to better
results is to change both the questions asked and the procedures used to
answer them-a change in the way regulators think about incentives
.... [O]nly with a comprehensive approach can regulators hope to over-
come the problems of case by case incentives ....
Managers require a firm commitment from regulators that good per-
formance will be rewarded and that the incentive criteria will be "clear,
predictable and realistically achievable."'176
further rulings in response to objections raised to evidence during the course of the hearing. This
discretion facilitates resolution of the matter pending.
172. Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 126, at 15.
173. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 21. Price Waterhouse published a report in 1979
entitled Survey of Management Audits in the Electric Utility Industry; see John W. Hall, Performance
Measurement Techniques: A Review, 116 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 25, 27 (1985). Hall cites Public Utility
Productivity, a 1976 symposium sponsored by the New York State Department of Public Service
and the State University at Albany and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 as two of
the most important events in the history of utility performance management. He also cites the 1981
National Regulatory Research Institute (under a grant from the Department of Energy) entitled The
Measurement of Electric Utility Performance: Preliminary Analysis and the NATIONAL ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1982).
174. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 29; see Re Kansas City Power & Rate Co., 75
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th, (PUR) 1, 22 (Missouri Pub. Utils. Comm'n. 1986); Re Gas Servicing, DR 83-
345, Supp. Order No. 17, 061) NHPUC June 4, 1984).
175. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 57.
176. Id. at 59; William J. Baumol, Productivity Incentive Clauses and Rate Adjustment for Infla-
tion, 110 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 11, 15 (1982); see CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES INDUSTRIES 290
(1969).
Conversely, a penalty could take the form of a lower rate of return and hence act as an efficiency
incentive. For instance, in Re South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR), 458,
484-85 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1979), the Commission set rates that would permit give the utility
the opportunity to earn revenues sufficient to obtain a rate of return on common equity at the lower
end of the range of such returns determined by the commission as fair and reasonable. The Commis-
sion considered the company capable of earning a return within a range above the lower limit
through the use of effective programs of cost reduction.
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Hence, incentive plans must be adaptable to changes in the eco-
nomic environment. 177 Available incentive programs include: (1) Oper-
ating and expense-based ratio plans; (2) plans involving partial operating
incentives; (3) automatic cost adjustments; 178 (4) rate caps; (5) "sliding
scale" plans;17 9 (6) indexed rates and regulatory lag; and (7) least cost
planning alternatives. 80 Iowa's State Commerce Commission devised a
generic incentive system, which considered service quality a proper fac-
tor in determining a reasonable rate-of-return. 1 1 An operating and ex-
pense based ratio plan was proposed by the FERC that considered
generic rate of return standards. Electricity industry management per-
formance considered average revenues per kilowatt-hour, comparing util-
ity performance of a preselected group of comparable utilities (though
opponents argued that these groups could not be validly developed). It
measured both static performance and dynamic performance over time.
Although it was structured over a five-year period, recent performance
was weighted greater given the lead time in implementing management
decisions into meritorious performance. Finally, the plan contemplated
management bonuses, which studies suggested might amount to 35% of
management's base salaries and requiring rate increases of .5% to 1%.
Criticism from the industry followed, arguing primarily that groups of
comparable utilities cannot be developed and that the average revenue is
an unsatisfactory measure of performance. However, the proposal did
not include rate of return adjustment and hence this adjustment was not
incorporated into a generic rate of return plan.l82
177. Joskow & Schmalensee, supra note 126, at 24 ("All of this at least shows that no single
incentive scheme will be optimal in all circumstances and [that] the appropriate incentive scheme for
any particular firm may change dramatically over time as economic conditions and the Commis-
sion's information change."). The authors reported that approximately 20 state public utility com-
missions had applied some type of incentive regulation program to at least one electric utility in their
respective jurisdictions.
178. Id. at 29. These plans involve partial automatic adjustments for differences between a base-
line figure and the actual cost of service. Prices that change out of proportion to changes in costs
therefore provide incentive for cost reduction.
179. Sliding scale plans require that ordinary, linear prices be automatically adjusted if the ac-
tual rate of return differs from the target rate of return. Thus prices are reduced if a firm lowers its
costs and its rate of return rises above the target while some of the excess profits are allocated to the
firm as an efficiency incentive. Id. at 27-28.
180. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 62-68.
181. See Re Standards for Public Utility Management Efficiency, 65 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
189, 196 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1985).
182. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 62-63; RESOURCES CONSULTING GROUP, 1 IN-
CENTIVE REGULATION (1983), in ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT 3.5-3.7, 4.2 (1983)
(prepared for the FERC). The plan was based on the Iowa Plan, 65 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 189,
195-96 (Iowa State Communications Comm'n 1985).
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Automatic cost adjustments can take the form of "earnings penal-
ties" imposed by regulators when a utility has "gorged" itself upon
"questionable or expensive" building program or failed to provide rea-
sonable service. These can take the form of negative adjustments when
the rate proceedings show "quantitatively" measured inefficient manage-
ment. However, there seems to be no consensus on how to make such an
adjustment.18 3 Thus, it is up to individual regulatory agencies to set cost
adjustments and other incentive standards or benchmarks.
Monopoly industries often behave (like other business entities) op-
portunistically. For example, they use information strategically. Ironi-
cally, the regulator has to rely on the regulated company for information
about performance.1 8 4 Regulators must get help from a regulated com-
pany in order to design and implement the incentive plan. Individualized
incentive plans are necessary for each company, allowing for different
business strategies, objectives, product or service maturity, growth pros-
pects etc. 18 5 Regulatory bodies should set the policy, leaving implemen-
tation up to the company, with the regulator scrutinizing the company's
results. For instance, the regulator could create a pool of funds
earmarked for bonuses, with the company deciding the eligibility and
amounts of individual bonuses.1 8 6
C. Public Consultation on Incentive Regulation
The National Energy Board set out a preliminary list of questions to
be addressed by participants in its forthcoming workshop on incentive
regulation scheduled of December 8-10, 1992 in Calgary."8 7 This paper
183. Nolan, supra note 134, at 53.
184. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 89. Opportunism has been defined as "self-inter-
est seeking with guile." Id. at 88 n.20 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:
FIRMS, MARKETS, AND POLICY CONTROL 26 (1986)).
185. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 137, at 139.
186. Id. at 144-45.
187. Public Consultation on Incentive Regulation, National Energy Board of Canada, File No.
4500-AOOO-9, Notice of Proceedings (Mar. 23, 1992 & June 22, 1992). The preliminary and non-
exhaustive list of questions posed to approximately 30 participants, representing industry, govern-
ment, and academia include: (1) Is the current regulatory regime still adequate to establish tolls that
reflect cost-effective transportation services?; (2) If not, could the current regime be adapted of modi-
fied to take more adequately into account economic efficiency aspects of toll regulation?; (3) If the
current regime were to be retained, adapted or modified, what changes could be introduced to the
structure of tolls and tariffs to encourage the pipeline companies and their customers to operate in
the most economically efficient way?; (4) What should be the characteristics of a viable incentive
regulation scheme?; (5) In light of the characteristics outlined in response to question (4), what
specific incentive regulation schemes have the potential to be viable in the Canadian regulatory and
business environments, and what are the strengths and weaknesses of each of these schemes?; (6)
Could different incentive schemes be implemented on different pipeline systems, or should only one
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has attempted to comment on some salient issues and realizes that many
questions are raised by altering the regulatory status quo. Accordingly,
this paper reaches a couple of conclusions, yet admittedly leaves ques-
tions unanswered. Hopefully there will be a "joinder of issues" as the
consultation process progresses, allowing for restatement of the conclu-
sions expressed here.
VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of incentive regulation is an idea whose time has come
in face of increased open access competition. The persistent gas bubble
and deregulation in Canada and the United States are creating new com-
mercial exigencies, complete with attendant transition costs. For in-
stance, the movement away from system gas sales towards direct sales
has contributed to market dislocation, which in turn requires competitive
responses by pipeline companies and regulators. Another example of the
changing competitive environment is the development of capacity bro-
kering ' in the United States. The extraterritorial effect of pipelines
along a common grid is a striking phenomenon as recently highlighted by
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) dispute with Alberta
aggregators (Alberta & Southern Gas Co.).1" 9
general regulatory regime be implemented?; (7) To the extent that incentive regulation may be ap-
propriate in the case of certain pipelines only, what attributes should a pipeline possess in order to be
considered for incentive regulation, and could different attributes justify different incentive regula-
tion schemes?; (8) What impact, positive or negative, could incentive regulation schemes have on the
financial integrity of the affected pipeline companies, on their capital structures, or on their overall
cost of capital (equity and debt), and how should any such impact be taken into account in deciding
whether to implement an incentive regulation scheme?; (9) How should the actual performance of an
incentive regulation scheme be empirically measured and evaluated, and how should the several
aspects of economic efficiency (e.g., allocative, technical, and dynamic efficiency) be measured and
weighted relative to one another? On July 22, 1992, the following question was added to the list by
the Ontario Ministry of Energy: "To what extent, if any, would the successful implementation of
any specific incentive regulatory scheme suggested for a Board jurisdiction pipeline require any com-
plementary changes in mode of regulation of service offerings by non-Board jurisdiction connecting
upstream or downstream pipelines?"
In a letter to participants, the Board stated that the concepts discussed and developed at the
workshop could be used in subsequent toll hearings, where they could be combined and tailored to
the circumstances of an applicant's pipeline.
188. Capacity brokering is the selling or renting by a shipper of its contracted pipeline capacity
to others. Gas inventory charge is a fixed charge or fee that covers the cost of holding gas reserves in
order to supply a customer. These charges are market sensitive rates that allow pipelines to recover
the cost of maintaining a sufficient gas supply to serve their customers without accumulating excess
inventories or incurring substantial take-or-pay liabilities. See Sheila S. Hollis, The Changing
Framework of Natural Gas Business and Law, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-4, 14-28 to 14-43
(1989); Alexander J. Black, Capacity Brokering of Natural Gas and Extraterritorial Regulatory Ef-
fect, 10 OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N REv. - (1992) (forthcoming).
189. National Energy Board Reasons for Decision, GH-R-91 (June 1992); Canadian Petroleum
Association Ltd. Application for Review of Decision re Alberta & Southern Gas Co., (GH-5-88), at
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Any incentive rate regulation scheme will have to balance the public
interest with the legitimate expectation interests of capital. This can be
accommodated by modest changes to the regulatory environment. Thus
the price cap model is not viable as it radically alters the focus of estab-
lished public utility hearing processes in Canada and the U.S. The price
cap model as used in Britain' 90 seems successful since British Gas was
privatized intact as a vertically integrated monopoly, and it provided an
relatively easy model to establish ab initio. Furthermore, the dominant
position of virtually all pipeline companies in the European Community
leaves nothing to contribute to the debate on stewardship of our Cana-
dian natural gas resources because of the immature status of "federal"
type regulation there. Major Canadian pipelines may be reticent to as-
sume the added risk that incentive rate regulation imposes upon profits.
Yet such a program might promote better risk allocation and lessen the
chance of imprudent contracting practices, which arguably led to the
take-or-pay problems of the 1980s. Any incentive rate program should
be generic and not voluntary and for the sake of legal certainty, and some
amendment to the NEB Act may be needed to preclude challenges on
this point. The broad parameters of the program have to be set unam-
biguously, leaving the pipeline companies free to implement the details.
A sliding scale plan involving plus or minus 1% (or even .5%) of the
present annual rate of return might be a good starting point. Total Fac-
tor Productivity (TFP) as measured by the CPI would appear to be a
good gauge for performance measurement. As an incentive for the extra
"risk", companies would be free to apportion some of the excess profits
as they think fit, including, bonuses to senior management, dividends
to shareholders or reinvestment in the capital base. Nonetheless,
5. Alberta & Southern buys gas from Canadian (Alberta & British Columbia) producers and exports
it to PGT at Kingsgate British Columbia for sale and delivery to Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E).
The gas from British Columbia is transported on the Westcoast Energy Inc. pipeline system into
pipeline systemowned and operated by the NOVA Corp. of Alberta. The Alberta and B.C. gas is
transported on the NOVA facilities for delivery to the pipeline facilities of ANG near Coleman,
Alberta. ANG (Alberta Natural Gas Company) transports the gas under a firm transportation con-
tract with A&S across southeastern British Columbia for sale and delivery by A&S to PGT at the
international boundary near Kingsgate, British Columbia. PGT, a wholly owned affiliate of PG&E,
transports the gas across Idaho, Washington, and Oregon for sale and delivery to PG&E at the
Oregon-California border near Malin, Oregon. PG&E, a combined gas and electric utility, then
transports and sells the gas to its customers throughout Northern California, including its major
load centers in Sacramento and San Francisco.
190. STRASSER & KOHLER, supra note 140, at 89; see Alexander J. Black, Competition Law and
British Natural Gas Regulation, 13 ENERGY L.J. 359 (1992).
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however it is implemented, incentive based regulation seems the best way
to ensure that Canada's natural gas regulatory regime will be able to keep
up with the dynamic changes that currently face the natural gas industry.
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